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The CARD Act on Campus
Jim Hawkins∗
Abstract
In February 2010, the Credit Card Accountability,
Responsibility, and Disclosure (CARD) Act intervened in student
credit card markets in a dramatic way, attempting to prevent
student over-indebtedness, to end aggressive marketing to college
students, and to reveal and change avaricious agreements between
credit card issuers and colleges. Yet, two years after it became
effective, we still have little measurement of whether the Act has
accomplished these goals.
This Article offers the first empirical assessment of the
rationales for the CARD Act and the Act’s effects. Over the two
years since the CARD Act went into effect, I conducted surveys of
more than 500 students at two different colleges. I also examined
300 agreements between issuers and college-related organizations,
which the CARD Act made publicly available for the first time.
Based on this survey and study, I found that many of the
CARD Act’s student and young consumer provisions have not
affected credit markets in the ways the Act’s proponents had
hoped. Young consumers are still qualifying for credit cards
without enough earned income to pay off the debt, and students
are still reporting high levels of credit card marketing efforts
aimed at the students. Most strikingly, the requirement that credit
card companies disclose the secret agreements between issuers and
colleges has caused virtually no change in the number of these
agreements or their terms.

∗ Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. I am
grateful to Ronald Mann, Julie Hill, Jeff Brown, and the participants of a
workshop at the University of South Carolina School of Law and the AALS
Section on Commercial and Related Consumer Law Roundtable on the CARD
Act for help on earlier drafts of this paper. I also want to express appreciation
for Shaun Cassin, Jennifer Chang, and Rebekah Reneau for research assistance.
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I. Introduction
The Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility, and
Disclosure Act of 2009 (CARD Act)1 is the most important credit
card legislation of our generation.2 Among the many important
provisions of this ground breaking Act, the Act’s sponsors
highlighted its protections of young consumers and college
students as some of the most significant. Senator Christopher
Dodd argued: “It is time to insist that credit card companies take
into account a young person’s ability to repay before allowing
them to take on what is all too often a lifetime worth of debt. Very
little we do in our legislation will be more important than these
provisions.”3
Senator Dodd was referring to several provisions that affect
how credit card companies interact with students and young
consumers. First, the CARD Act requires that credit card
companies verify that people under twenty-one have the ability to
repay their credit card debt.4 Second, it places restrictions on
credit card issuers’ marketing activities aimed at young
consumers, including prohibiting giving tangible gifts to students
on college campuses and banning credit bureaus from giving out
young consumers’ addresses.5 Finally, it obligates credit card
companies and colleges to disclose their agreements about credit
card marketing to students.6 The central goal of these provisions
was to prevent young consumers from accumulating excessive
credit card debt.7

1. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734.
2. See, e.g., Christopher L. Peterson, The CARD Act in Perspective:
Ongoing Efforts to Find Balance in Credit Card Regulation, 2011 UTAH L. REV.
335, 336 (2011) (stating that “the country has struggled to strike a balance
between the risks of consumer indebtedness and the convenience that credit
cards provide” and calling the CARD Act “the most important effort to recast
this balance in several generations”).
3. 155 CONG. REC. S5,316 (daily ed. May 11, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Christopher Dodd).
4. See infra Part III.A.
5. See infra Part III.B.
6. See infra Part III.C.
7. See infra Part III.D.
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Student credit cards are a hotly contested issue,8 and the
CARD Act’s young consumer provisions have similarly
generated significant academic debate about their theoretical
underpinnings and likely effects.9 But, two years after these
protections became effective, we still have little empirical
measurement of whether the Act’s goals have been achieved and
whether either critics’ or supporters’ predictions about the Act
have come true. While academics have conducted empirical
studies on other aspects of the Act10 and have noted the efficacy
8. For just a few of the many possible examples, see generally RONALD J.
MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF PAYMENT CARD
MARKETS (2006) (providing a detailed discussion of credit cards and their costs
and benefits); ROBERT D. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION: THE CONSEQUENCES OF
AMERICA’S ADDICTION TO CREDIT (2000) (discussing the prevalence of credit card
usage in the United States, including a chapter devoted to credit cards aimed at
college students); Katherine Porter, College Lessons: The Financial Risks of
Dropping Out, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 85
(Katherine Porter ed., 2012) (analyzing the financial difficulties of those who
completed some college but did not graduate); Vincent D. Rougeau,
Rediscovering Usury: An Argument for Legal Controls on Credit Card Interest
Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1996) (discussing the growing problems associated
with credit cards, with students as one aspect of the overall problem).
9. See, e.g., Eboni S. Nelson, Young Consumer Protection in the
“Millennial” Age, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 369 (2011) [hereinafter Young Consumer
Protection] (discussing and predicting the effects of the Act’s young consumer
provisions); Eboni S. Nelson, From the Schoolhouse to the Poorhouse: The Credit
CARD Act’s Failure to Adequately Protect Young Consumers, 56 VILL. L. REV. 1
(2011) [hereinafter Schoolhouse to Poorhouse] (applauding the passage of the
Act and suggesting further action); Andrew A. Schwartz, Old Enough to Fight,
Old Enough to Swipe: A Critique of the Infancy Rule in the Federal Credit CARD
Act, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 407 (2011) (advocating for the repeal of a section of the
Act that forbids individuals under age twenty-one from having credit cards);
Manley Williams & Sara E. Emley, CARD Act’s Ability to Pay Proposal Ignites
Public Policy Debate, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1417 (2011) (describing the debate
between the business community and consumer advocates over the Act’s abilityto-pay proposal); Regina L. Hinson, Note, Credit Card Reform Goes to College,
14 N.C. BANKING INST. 287 (2010) (describing the Act’s background,
modifications, and likely effects); Kathryn A. Wood, Note, Credit Card
Accountability, Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009: Protecting Young
Consumers or Impinging on Their Financial Freedom?, 5 BROOKLYN J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 159 (2010) (describing the Act’s intended impact on young people,
the negative effects it will have, and some proposed solutions).
10. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing: The CARD
Act and Beyond 1 (N.Y.U. Center for L., Econ. & Org., Working Paper No. 11-40,
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1960005 (arguing that “[p]ost-CARD
Act, consumers continue to face high long-term prices and low short-term prices,
and imperfectly rational consumers still find it difficult to understand the cost of
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of many of its provisions,11 no one has measured the impact of
the young consumer provisions. Members of Congress have been
quick to congratulate the government for stopping “students from
being sent credit card offers”12 without bothering to check if the
CARD Act’s provisions have actually had that effect.
The Act’s consequences for college students and other young
consumers should be the central concern of those studying these
provisions. As Elizabeth Warren observed, while serving as
Assistant to the President and Special Advisor to the Secretary of
the Treasury on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
[The Bureau] think[s] it is appropriate to ask whether [the
Act] has had its intended effects and how the credit card
marketplace has changed. Where there are clear causal links,
we need to draw them out. And where the connections are
more tenuous, we need to keep asking questions and analyzing
data.13

credit card borrowing”); Joshua M. Frank, Credit Card Clarity: CARD Act
Reform Works (Center for Responsible Lending, Working Paper, Feb. 16, 2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2000416 (evaluating the CARD Act’s
effects on interest rates and direct mail offers); THE PEW HEALTH GROUP, TWO
STEPS FORWARD: AFTER THE CREDIT CARD ACT, CREDIT CARDS ARE SAFER AND
MORE TRANSPARENT—BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN (2010), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/our_work_report_detail.aspx?id=60075 (reporting the
findings of a survey of credit card issuer practices, but only devoting fifty-seven
words to the young consumer provisions). The Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau held a conference on the one-year anniversary of the CARD Act’s
provisions entering into force and emphasized the need to measure the Act’s
effects, but none of the key findings presented at the conference related to the
young consumer provisions. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CARD
Act
Conference:
Key
Findings,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/creditcards/credit-card-act/card-act-conference-key-findings (last visited Sept. 24,
2012) (describing the February 22, 2011 conference and its key findings) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
11. See Williams & Emley, supra note 9, at 1419 (“Early indications
suggest that the CARD Act has been successful in eliminating some of the more
controversial practices of card issuers.”); Frank, supra note 10, at 4 (arguing
that the CARD Act has not made credit cards more expensive or less accessible).
12. 156 CONG. REC. H660 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 2010) (statement of Rep. Ralph
Hall).
13. Elizabeth Warren, Special Assistant to the President & Special Advisor
to the Sec’y of the Treasury on the Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, The CARD Act:
One Year Later (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/speech/thecard-act-one-year-later (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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This Article offers the first empirical measurement of the
effects of the CARD Act’s young consumer provisions. To capture
information about the Act’s effects, I conducted a series of surveys
over a two-year period that asked more than 500 college students
about their experiences with credit card companies. Also, I
examined 300 agreements between credit card companies and
colleges over two years, evaluating the terms of those agreements
and any changes that had occurred since the CARD Act’s
implementation.
The results are surprising. Contrary to the predictions of the
Act’s sponsors, the Act’s restrictions on credit card companies’
activities have not substantially decreased the number of
students reporting instances of credit card marketing. Similarly,
provisions that require credit card issuers to evaluate young
consumers’ ability to repay their debt have not prevented overindebtedness among students. I offer data that demonstrate how
students are using other forms of debt to qualify for their credit
card debt. The starkest outcome of my research is the finding
that requiring credit card issuers to disclose the terms of their
agreements with colleges has had almost no effect on the number
of agreements between issuers and colleges or on the terms of
those agreements.
In addition to measuring the CARD Act’s effectiveness,
information from the surveys and study calls into question some
important rationales that academics and policymakers used for
intervening in this market, while confirming other justifications
for the Act. First, the low levels of student credit card
indebtedness reported in the student surveys undermine the
claim that the CARD Act was necessary to stop students from
becoming overly indebted to credit card companies. Second,
information from the agreements between issuers and colleges
reveals that the claims that colleges are being incentivized to trap
students in debt have been overstated. But, on the other hand,
the agreements are primarily aimed at moving students into
credit card accounts, a finding that confirms the suspicions of
policymakers seeking disclosures.
By revealing the flaws in some of the justifications for the
CARD Act and the ways that the Act has failed to live up to its
potential, this Article hopes to guide policymakers as they
consider amending the Act. In addition to informing potential
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amendments to the CARD Act itself, this Article’s data may prove
useful to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as it
considers how to regulate student credit cards.14 The Bureau’s
architect initially proposed restricting all marketing to college
students,15 and this Article can inform the discussion of that
suggestion. Finally, this Article contributes to the academic
debate about student credit cards. Before this Article, the social
science literature on student credit cards had only documented
the effects of credit education as a means of affecting student
credit card behavior.16 This Article adds to that literature by
studying the effectiveness of the CARD Act as an example of legal
intervention into the student credit card market.
Part II outlines my empirical approach, discussing how I
conducted my two-year survey and my study of college–issuer
agreements. I present information about the nature and
limitations of my survey and study as well as some background
information from the findings of these projects.
Part III uses the results of these efforts to assess the
rationales that proponents of the CARD Act offered in its support.
In describing the CARD Act’s young consumer provisions, I use
existing empirical and theoretical research to explain why
proponents of the Act believed its young consumer provisions
were important. Then, using the data from my survey of students
and study of college–issuer agreements, I evaluate those
justifications, finding some of them sound and others, including
the most important justification for the Act, deeply flawed.
In Part IV, I offer an empirical measurement of the effects of
each of the CARD Act’s young consumer provisions. For the
ability-to-repay provision, I describe how the loopholes
Regulation Z created around the ability-to-pay requirement have
engulfed the rule. The survey data reveal the extent to which
14. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
§ 1002(12), 12 U.S.C. § 5481(12) (2012).
15. See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY, Summer 2007,
at 8, 18 (predicting the Bureau would discourage “marketing targeted at college
students or people under age 21”).
16. See, e.g., Troy Adams & Monique Moore, High-Risk Health and Credit
Behavior Among 18- to 25-Year-Old College Students, 56 J. AM. C. HEALTH 101,
101 (2007) (discussing the factors that various social science studies have
researched and linked to credit card usage among students).
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students are using other forms of debt, such as student loans, to
qualify for credit card debt. For the marketing provisions, I
explain that the number of students reporting instances of credit
card marketing remains high even after the Act’s effective date,
but I use the data obtained over the two years I conducted the
surveys to illustrate how the Act appears to be having its
intended effect of decreasing marketing efforts aimed at students.
Finally, the study of college–issuer agreements reveals that the
Act’s disclosure requirements have had little effect on the
relationships between issuers and college-related organizations.
In Part V, I conclude by suggesting lessons that the CARD
Act offers to regulators who are crafting consumer credit
regulation.
II. Empirical Strategy for Measuring the Effect of the CARD Act’s
Young Consumer Provisions
This Part describes the novel approaches I took to
understand how the CARD Act is affecting students and the
relationship between credit card issuers and colleges or collegerelated organizations. In addition to laying out the methodology I
followed and the limitations of my approaches, I also describe
some of the background findings that inform the remainder of the
Article.
A. College Student Survey Methodology
To obtain information from students about their experiences
with credit card marketing, I surveyed 527 students at two
different universities over the course of two years.17 The bulk of
the students were undergraduate students at the University of
Houston. The University of Houston is a large, urban public
school.18 In November 2010, I surveyed 338 students in three
17. All of the surveys were conducted under the approval of the University
of Houston’s Institutional Review Board.
18. See Univ. of Hous., UH at a Glance, http://www.uh.edu/about/uh-glance
(last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (“Founded in 1927, the University of Houston is the
leading public research university in the vibrant international city of Houston.
Each year, we educate more than 39,800 students in more than 300
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different history classes. In November 2011, I changed the survey
instrument slightly to reflect a new year and surveyed 79
students in another history class.19 In addition to these students
at the University of Houston, in January 2012, I also surveyed
students at Baylor University, a private, religiously affiliated
university located in Waco, Texas.20 At Baylor, I surveyed 110
students in an introductory geology class.
In all of the classes, the response rate was very high with a
large majority filling out the surveys. I calculated the exact
response rate in two classes by comparing the number of people
marked present in the class and the number of surveys I received
back. In both of these classes, the response rate was close to 90%.
I estimate a similar response rate in the other classes. While it
may be ideal to have an exact response rate in every class,
similar surveys of students relating to credit card use often do not
report any response rates at all,21 so the reported rate of
responses goes beyond the standard reflected in other studies.
undergraduate and graduate academic programs . . . . UH is located in Houston,
Texas, the nation’s fourth-largest city . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
19. The updated survey is presented in Appendix A.
20. See Baylor Univ., Get to Know Us, http://www.baylor.edu/about (last
visited Sept. 24, 2012) (“Baylor University in Waco, Texas, is a private Baptist
university . . . [w]ith more than 15,000 students working toward degrees in 151
areas of study . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
21. See, e.g., Sheri Lokken Worthy et al., Sensation-Seeking, Risk-Taking,
and Problematic Financial Behaviors of College Students, 31 J. FAM. ECON.
ISSUES 161, 165 (2010) (discussing the survey questions, the survey process, and
the respondents but not the response rate); Jill M. Norvilitis & Michael G.
MacLean, The Role of Parents in College Students’ Financial Behaviors and
Attitudes, 31 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 55, 57 (2010) (discussing the survey method,
including the composition of the body of respondents, but not mentioning the
response rate); Jill M. Norvilitis et al., Personality Factors, Money Attitudes,
Financial Knowledge, and Credit-Card Debt in College Students, 36 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1395, 1402 (2006) [hereinafter Personality Factors] (stating that
the refusal rate is unknown and the response rate therefore cannot be reported
confidently); Jill M. Norvilitis et al., Factors Influencing Levels of Credit-Card
Debt in College Students, 33 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 935, 938 (2003)
[hereinafter Factors Influencing Debt Levels] (explaining that it is impossible to
know how many refused to take the survey form but reporting the response rate
of those who actually took a survey form); James A. Roberts & Eli Jones, Money
Attitudes, Credit Card Use, and Compulsive Buying Among American College
Students, 35 J. CONSUMER AFF. 213, 222 (2001) (discussing the study and the
sample set but not the response rate).
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The high level of responses should dispel any concerns about selfselection bias.22 Other studies like this one that stated a response
rate reported much lower rates than the rate in this Article’s
study.23
When compared to other surveys studying students and
credit cards, this study generally has a higher number of
subjects.24 Additionally, many other similar studies only survey
22. See Michael E. Staten & John M. Barron, College Student Credit Card
Usage 11 (Georgetown Univ. McDonough Sch. of Bus. Credit Research Ctr.,
Working Paper No. 65, 2002), available at http://faculty.msb.edu/prog/
CRC/pdf/WP65.pdf (criticizing two studies about student card use because they
did not report response rates and, therefore, it was impossible to determine the
level of self-selection bias).
23. See Celia Ray Hayhoe et al., Differences in Spending Habits and Credit
Use of College Students, 34 J. CONSUMER AFF. 113, 118 (2000) (reporting a 16%
response rate); Celia Ray Hayhoe et al., Discriminating the Number of Credit
Cards Held by College Students Using Credit and Money Attitudes, 20 J. ECON.
PSYCHOL. 643, 648 (1999) (reporting a response rate of 17%); Angela C. Lyons, A
Profile of Financially At-Risk College Students, 38 J. CONSUMER AFF. 56, 63
(2004) (reporting a response rate of 34%); Carl A. Markovich & Sharon A.
DeVaney, College Seniors’ Personal Finance Knowledge and Practices, 89 J. FAM.
& CONSUMER SCI. 61, 62 (1997) (reporting a 49.8% response rate); Kay M. Palan
et al., Compulsive Buying Behavior in College Students: The Mediating Role of
Credit Card Misuse, 19 J. MARKETING THEORY & PRAC. 81, 86 (reporting a 47.3%
response rate); Cliff A. Robb & Deanna L. Sharpe, Effect of Personal Financial
Knowledge on College Students’ Credit Card Behavior, 20 J. FIN. COUNSELING &
PLAN. 25, 29 (2009) (reporting a 24% response rate).
24. See Emma Davies & Stephen E.G. Lea, Student Attitudes to Student
Debt, 16 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 663, 667 (1995) (pulling data from a survey of 140
students); Hayhoe et al., Differences in Spending Habits and Credit Use of
College Students, supra note 23, at 118 (using a sample of 480 students);
Hayhoe et al., Discriminating the Number of Credit Cards Held by Students
Using Credit and Money Attitudes, supra note 23, at 648–49 (reporting survey
responses from 426 students and using 359 surveys for analysis); Jeff Joireman
et al., Concern with Immediate Consequences Magnifies the Impact of
Compulsive Buying Tendencies on College Students’ Credit Card Debt, 44 J.
CONSUMER AFF. 155, 162 (2010) (surveying 249 students); So-hyun Joo et al.,
Credit Card Attitudes and Behaviors of College Students, 37 C. STUDENT J. 405,
406 (2003) (using data from 242 surveys); Ali Kara et al., Credit Card
Development Strategies for the Youth Market: The Use of Cojoint Analysis, 12
INTERNATIONAL J. OF BANK MARKETING 30 (1994) (using a sample of 229
surveys); Lokken Worthy et al, supra note 21, at 165 (using data from 450
students); Phylis M. Mansfield et al., Self-Control and Credit-Card Use Among
College Students, 92 PSYCHOL. REP. 1067, 1072 (2003) (analyzing 165 surveys);
Markovich & DeVaney, supra note 23, at 62 (using a sample of 236 surveys);
Norvilitis et al., Personality Factors, supra note 21, at 1400 (surveying 448
students); Norvilitis & MacLean, supra note 21, at 57 (surveying 173 students);
Palan et al., supra note 23, at 86 (analyzing a sample of 260 surveys); Roberts &
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students at a single school,25 so including a public and a private
school suggest the results of this survey have a greater potential
to be more representative,26 although the results are
geographically located within a single state.
All of the information from the surveys was entered into and
analyzed using Stata software. The students in the sample
ranged from freshmen to students who had been in college for
more than four years. Table 1 provides details of the sample.
Table 1: Sample Demographic Information
Univ. of
Houston

Baylor
Univ.

Total27

N = 417

N = 110

N = 527

1

49.16%

58.18%

51.04%

2

25.18%

25.45%

25.24%

3

13.43%

9.09%

12.52%

4

6.47%

6.36%

6.45%

More than 4

5.76%

.91%

4.74%

Years in School

Jones, supra note 21, at 222 (using a sample of 406 college students).
25. See Davies & Lea, supra note 24, at 667 (University of Exeter
students); Joo et al., supra note 24, at 406 (students from “the College of Human
Sciences of one large university in a southwestern state”); Mansfield et al.,
supra note 24, at 1072 (students of “a public college in the northeastern United
States”); Markovich & DeVaney, supra note 23, at 62 (Purdue University
students); Norvilitis & MacLean, supra note 21, at 57 (students of “a mediumsized state university in the United States”); Palan et al., supra note 23, at 86
(students at “a major public [M]idwestern university”); Robb & Sharpe, supra
note 23, at 29 (students at “a large Midwestern university in the United
States”); Roberts & Jones, supra note 21, at 222 (students of “a private
university with an enrollment of 13,000 students in Texas”).
26. Cf. Todd Starr Palmer et al., College Students’ Credit Card Debt and
the Role of Parental Involvement: Implications for Public Policy, 20 J. PUB. POL’Y
& MARKETING 105, 108 (2001) (“In collecting data, the researchers deliberately
sought a mix of public and private schools . . . .”).
27. The percentages do not add up to 100% because the responses of 1.52%
of students were either missing or impossible to interpret.
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Race

Non-Hispanic White

26.38%

80.00%

37.57%

Non-Hispanic
Black/African
American

17.99%

2.73%

14.80%

Latino

26.14%

10.00%

22.77%

Asian

19.90%

2.73%

16.32%

Other

8.15%

2.73%

7.02%

Male

48.92%

29.09%

44.78%

Female

51.08%

70.00%

55.03%

Under 21

73.38%

84.55%

75.71%

Over 21

26.62%

15.45%

24.29%

Gender

Age

The distribution of men and women roughly approximates
the ratios at the University of Houston,28 but women are
overrepresented in the sample from Baylor University.29
Similarly, in the sample from Baylor, Non-Hispanic White
students are slightly overrepresented, and Asians and NonHispanic African Americans/Black students are slightly
underrepresented in the sample.30 In the University of Houston
28. See Univ. of Hous., Facts and Figures, http://www.uh.edu/about/uhglance/facts-figures/index.php#distribution (last visited Sept. 24, 2012)
(providing figures from which one can calculate that 50.17% of students at the
University of Houston are men and 49.83% are women) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
29. See BAYLOR UNIV., PROFILE OF UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS FALL 2010
AND FALL 2011 2 (Sept. 9, 2011), http://www.baylor.edu/content/services/docu
ment.php/151566.pdf (reporting 42.1% of Baylor’s fall 2011 students are men
and 57.9% are women).
30. See id., at 3 (stating that 7.9% of Baylor’s fall 2011 students are African
American, 7.9% are Asian, 13.6% are Latino, 65.6% are white, and 5% are other
(including Alaskan Native/American Indian, Pacific Islander, Multiracial, and
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sample, Non-Hispanic African Americans/Black students are
slightly overrepresented, and Non-Hispanic White students are
slightly underrepresented.31 These differences in racial
background are likely of no significance because existing research
indicates race does not affect rates of credit card ownership.32
Research has also found that attitudes toward credit are not
affected by gender.33 The samples were purposefully skewed to
include more freshmen and sophomores than the general
university populations. Figure 1 compares the racial backgrounds
of the sample and general student populations.
Figure 1: Comparison of Racial Backgrounds of Sample Groups
and Actual Populations
100
90

Other

80
70

Asian

60
50

Latino

40
30
20

Non-Hispanic African
American/Black

10

Non-Hispanic White

0

Baylor
Sample

Actual
Houston
Actual
Baylor
Sample
Houston
Population
Population

As with any study, this type of survey-based study has
several limitations. First, the data are all based on answers from
Not Specified/Unknown)).
31. See Univ. of Hous., supra note 28 (stating that 12.1% of the University
of Houston’s 2011 students are African American, 19.3% are Asian American,
23.5% are Hispanic, 33.1% are White/Other, and 12% are Hawaiian/Pacific
Islander, International, Multiracial, Native American, or Unknown).
32. See Robb & Sharpe, supra note 23, at 26 (citing evidence to support the
assertion that “there is little difference in terms of credit card ownership based
on college students’ ethnicity”).
33. See Joo et al., supra note 24, at 415 (finding that gender was not a
significant factor affecting credit attitudes).
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the students, and I could not and did not undertake any steps to
verify that the responses were true. Some researchers contend
that students may underreport levels of credit card use or debt
because of the social desirability bias;34 others note that selfreports are not longitudinal so they do not account for credit card
debts that have been paid off by student loans;35 and others claim
students may simply misremember information about their
experiences with credit cards.36 Alternative approaches, however,
would be very expensive, so surveys offer a plausible method for
capturing information about students’ experiences with credit
card marketing.37 Almost every study of student credit cards
employs this strategy, so this limitation comports with
established standards.38
Second, the samples are not nationally representative, so I
can only make claims about the universities I studied. This
limitation is also present in virtually all studies of student
cards,39 and nothing indicates that these particular public and
private schools are atypical.

34. See Mansfield et al., supra note 24, at 1076–77 (acknowledging and
discussing the “potential social desirability bias associated with the balances
reported”); Wayne Jekot, Note, Over the Limit: The Case for Increased
Regulation of Credit Cards for College Students, 5 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 109, 112
(2005) (suggesting that self-reporting could produce inaccurate results “because
respondents may incorrectly report unflattering data” (citation omitted)).
35. See Robert D. Manning & Ray Kirshak, Credit Cards on Campus:
Academic Inquiry, Objective Empiricism, or Advocacy Research?, 35 J. STUDENT
FIN. AID 39, 45 (2005) (stating that “credit card debt statistics tend to be
underestimated by respondents and do not include past credit card debts that
were paid with student loans, family loans, or other bank consolidation loans”).
36. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-773, CONSUMER FINANCE:
COLLEGE STUDENTS AND CREDIT CARDS 16 (2001) (noting that reliance on
memory is a limitation on the accuracy of reports that are based on studentreported information).
37. See Michael E. Staten & John M. Barron, Usage of Credit Cards
Received Through College-Marketing Programs, 34 J. STUDENT FIN. AID, no. 3,
2004 at 7, 20–21 (criticizing data based on self-reporting but noting that “survey
responses are a unique source of information on such questions as how and
when students first receive their credit cards and their general attitudes toward
card usage”).
38. See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text (providing numerous
examples of studies using self-reporting).
39. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (providing numerous
examples of studies that drew their entire sample from a single school).
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Finally, the sample was a purposive sample, so it is nonrandom. This approach, however, was necessary to obtain a
higher number of responses from freshmen, sophomores, and
students under the age of twenty-one. The limitations of this
purposive sample were mitigated by selecting classes that were
part of the general degree requirements and by surveying at both
public and private schools.40
B. College–Card Issuer Agreement Study Methodology
The study of college–issuer agreements made use of
agreements that the CARD Act compelled issuers to disclose.41
The Federal Reserve Board has posted all of these agreements on
the Internet and has published reports about some aspects of
them.42 My goal in the study of college–issuer agreements was to
code information about a representative sample of these
agreements and to determine what changes occurred within
agreements after the CARD Act went into effect.
In 2009, there were 1,044 agreements between credit card
issuers and universities or related organizations.43 To obtain a
representative sample of these agreements, I exceeded
established precision levels where the confidence level is 95% and
P = 0.5 by evaluating 300 agreements.44 To ensure that I sampled
40. See Palmer et al., supra note 26, at 111 (noting that a purposive
sample, rather than a random sample, is a drawback, but that such a sample
was necessary to ensure better response rates and less bias, and the selection of
both public and private schools and students with different majors attempted to
minimize the harm).
41. See infra Part III.C (discussing these agreements in greater detail).
42. See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., College Credit Card
Agreements, http://www.federalreserve.gov/collegecreditcardagreements (last
visited Sept. 24, 2012) (providing a tool to browse or search the full text of
college credit card agreements) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
43. See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., College Credit Card
Agreements, 2009 Full Data Spreadsheet, http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/rptcongress/creditcard/2010/downloads/college_credit_card_agreemen
ts_data.xls (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) [hereinafter FRB 2009 Full Data
Spreadsheet] (providing information about all college credit card agreements for
2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
44. See Glenn D. Israel, Sampling the Evidence of Extension Program
Impact (2009), http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pd005 (last visited Sept. 24, 2012)
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a random collection of the 1,044 agreements when I selected the
300 to review, I used a web-based True Random Number
Generator to generate a list of numbers between 1 and 1,044 by
using atmospheric noise to produce the results.45 Thus, the data
discussed in this Article are representative of the entire universe
of agreements between college-related entities and card issuers.
Three research assistants obtained and entered information
about the college–issuer agreements. I developed a written
protocol that they followed after receiving training. After the
results were entered and the study was complete, I reviewed the
data for anomalies.
For each agreement, we obtained thirty different data points.
We pulled statistical data from the Federal Reserve’s compilation
of information about the agreements, such as the annual
payments by the issuer and the number of accounts opened. We
then obtained information about whether the entities were part
of public or private institutions and the precise types of
association. The most significant coding work involved reading
the agreements and recording information about (1) the
obligations of the collegiate entities under the agreement, such as
requirements to provide mailing lists, to exclusively promote the
issuer, and to provide advertising help to the issuer; (2) the rights
of collegiate entities, such as the right to approve advertisements
and the right to royalties; (3) the terms of the credit cards issued
pursuant to the agreement, including whether they had annual
fees and how much interest is charged; and finally, (4) any
changes in the agreement between 2009 and 2010, the period
during which the CARD Act went into effect. All of this
(discussing techniques to ensure random sampling) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Glenn D. Israel, Determining Sample Size (1992),
http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pd006 (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (providing a table to
help determine the proper sample size based on population size, precision level,
and confidence level) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
45. The random number generator was found on the Internet. See Mads
Haahr, Random Sequence Generator, http://www.random.org/sequences (last
visited Sept. 24, 2012) (providing a tool to generate random sequences of
integers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The website
explains the theory and mechanics of how the generator works. See Mads
Haahr, Introduction to Randomness and Random Numbers, http://www.
random.org/randomness (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (describing random number
generators and explaining how the site’s own random number generator works)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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information was entered into a custom-designed Excel
spreadsheet and imported into Stata for analysis.
Most of the agreements came from a single issuer, a
characteristic that also dominates the aggregated data reported
by the Federal Reserve. Table 2 breaks the sample down by the
credit card issuer.
Table 2: Issuers in Sample
Issuer

Percentage

Number

FIA Card Services, N.A.

86.67%

260

U.S. Bank National
Association ND

5.33%

16

Chase Bank USA, N.A.

3.00%

9

Pennsylvania State
Employees Credit Union

3.00%

3

UMB Bank, N.A.

3.00%

3

INTRUST Bank, N.A.

3.00%

3

GE Money Bank

0.33%

1

USAA Savings Bank

0.33%

1

First National Bank of
Omaha

0.33%

1

Barclays Bank Delaware

0.33%

1

Capital One Bank (USA), N.A.

0.33%

1

Commerce Bank, N.A.

0.33%

1

In terms of the university-related organizations with whom
the issuer contracted, Figure 2 depicts that 37.67% of the
agreements were between credit card issuers and undergraduate
colleges, 32.67% were with alumni associations, 7.33% were with
foundations, 2.00% were with professional schools, and 1.67%
were with alumni associations and universities together. Entities
that did not fall within one of the other categories made up
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18.67%.46 Of the agreements with undergraduate colleges, 17.70%
of the institutions were public and 82.30% were private.47
Figure 2: Types of Institutions with Issuer Agreements
Professional Foundation, 22
School, 6

Alumni
Association with
College, 5

Other, 55

Alumni
Association, 98

Undergraduate
College, 113

Private Schools,
93

Public Schools,
20

The agreements describe the interest rates for a variety of
types of credit accounts. For the basic credit card in each
agreement, the rates ranged from 6.15% to 19.9%, with a median
rate of 13.15%.48 The agreements also contain information about
royalties provided to the college-related organization for different
aspects of the credit card accounts, such as royalties for each
account opened, royalties for each annual fee paid, and royalties
for accounts remaining open at the end of the year. Accountopening royalties ranged from $0.80 to $50 for each account
opened, with a median royalty of $1. Annual-fee royalties ranged
from $1 to $20 for each annual fee paid, with a median royalty of
$1. Remaining-open royalties ranged from $1 to $6.10 for each

46. This information is provided in the Federal Reserve’s spreadsheet
aggregating data disclosed by issuers. See FRB 2009 Full Data Spreadsheet,
supra note 43 (providing the information about each agreement).
47. We obtained this information by doing Internet searches about each of
the undergraduate institutions.
48. To determine the interest rates for agreements with multiple possible
rates for the basic card, I always picked the highest listed rate. Twenty-one
percent (n=63) of the agreements did not include an interest rate in the
agreement.
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account remaining open at the end of the year, with a median
royalty of $1.
The vast majority of the agreements, 97.67%, required the
college to promote exclusively the issuer’s credit card.49 The
agreement between MBNA America Bank, N.A. (MBNA America)
and Alabama State University (ASU) provides a good example of
such a provision:
ASU agrees that during the term of this Agreement it will
endorse the Program exclusively and that neither ASU nor
any ASU Affiliate shall, by itself or in conjunction with others,
directly or indirectly: (i) sponsor, advertise, aid, develop,
market, solicit proposals for programs offering, or discuss with
any organization (other than MBNA America) the providing of,
any Financial Service Products of any organization other than
MBNA America; (ii) license or allow others to license the
Trademarks in relation to or for promoting any Financial
Service Products of any entity other than MBNA America; and
(iii) sell, rent or otherwise make available or allow others to
sell, rent or otherwise make available any of its mailing lists
or information about any current or potential Members in
relation to or for promoting any Financial Service Products of
any entity other than MBNA America. Notwithstanding
anything else in this Agreement to the contrary, ASU may
accept print advertising from any financial institution
provided that the advertisement does not contain an express
or implied endorsement by ASU of said financial institution or
the advertised Financial Service Product.50

In addition to these terms, which serve as a backdrop for
understanding the arrangement between issuers and colleges, the
other terms of the agreements are discussed at length in Parts III
and IV.
One limitation of my approach is that interrater reliability
was not assessed. But, because the data we gathered was based
on relatively objective criteria, interrater reliability should not be
a significant factor in the validity of the study.

49. Six agreements lacked any term about exclusivity, and one agreement
explicitly stated the agreement was not exclusive.
50. Alabama State University Affinity Agreement, Ala. St. Univ.-MBNA
Am. Bank, N.A., § 2, Oct. 30, 2001, available at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/credit cardagreementscontent/collegeagreement_29.pdf.
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III. Understanding the CARD Act’s Young Consumer Provisions
and Assessing the Act’s Rationales
This Part briefly introduces the changes the CARD Act made
to the laws governing young consumer and student credit cards.
For each change, I outline the most significant theoretical and
empirical academic research that animated the changes, and I
describe the arguments made in the U.S. House of
Representatives and Senate in support of the law. In Part III.C, I
use the findings of my study of college–issuer agreements to
assess the rationales that proponents of the disclosure provision
offered in support of it. Some of the concerns policymakers and
academics had about these agreements were proven to be
accurate by my study, such as concerns that these agreements
were aimed at students specifically and that they require collegerelated organizations to provide private information to issuers
and provide forums to market to students. Other rationales,
however, including one of the most prominent, related to the
extent to which these agreements engender high credit card
utilization, appear to have been based on faulty, albeit
understandable, predictions about what these previously secret
agreements contained.
The Part concludes by applying the findings of my student
survey to dispute the central rationale for the CARD Act—
excessive student credit card indebtedness. I argue that a pivotal
series of studies about student cards conducted by Sallie Mae
over the last decade have been repeatedly misused by many
academics offering student-card policy prescriptions and by
members of Congress who promoted the young consumer
provisions of the CARD Act. This argument is not intended to
imply that the Act should not have been passed or should be
repealed. Rather, it is meant as a call to policymakers and
academics to establish an accurate view of student credit card
usage and debt levels.
In its provisions on young consumers, the CARD Act makes
four changes to the Truth in Lending Act (TILA)51 and one

51. See Consumer Credit Protection Act §§ 101–45, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2008).
For discussion of these changes, see infra Part III.A and Part III.B.
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change to the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).52 These
statutory changes are clarified by administrative rules in
Regulation Z.
A. Ability to Pay
The Act’s most substantial change to the TILA is its
requirement that companies evaluate young consumers’ ability to
repay debts incurred before extending credit to them.53
Consumers can demonstrate an ability to repay either by getting
a cosigner who can repay or by showing an “independent means
of repaying any obligation arising from the proposed extension of
credit.”54
Although this appears to establish a strict standard,
Regulation Z’s implementation of the provision reveals otherwise.
First, under Regulation Z, young consumers who are applying for
themselves must only have the ability to repay the minimum
balance due each month on the account, not the outstanding
balance.55 Paying one’s minimum balance does little to extricate
most people from their debt because the minimum balance is a
small fraction of the overall debt owed.56 Second, the Federal
Reserve has been clear that students can use any income or
assets to show an ability to pay the minimum balance. In
explaining why it rejected suggestions to limit the income a
student can rely on to show earned income, the Federal Reserve
stated that it believed a lower standard “will provide sufficient
protection for consumers less than twenty-one years old without
52. See Fair Credit Reporting Act §§ 601–29, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2008). For
discussion of this change, see infra Part IV.B.1.
53. See 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c)(8) (2012) (establishing requirements that a
consumer under age twenty-one must satisfy before being given an open end
consumer credit plan).
54. Id.
55. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.51(a) (2012) (stating that the issuer must consider
the ability of the consumer “to make the required minimum periodic payments
under the terms of the account based on the consumer’s income or assets and
current obligations”).
56. See Julia Lane, Note, Will Credit Cardholders Default over Minimum
Payment Hikes?, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 331, 346 (2006) (stating that the
minimum monthly payment is generally 2% or 3% of the total balance on a
credit card).
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unnecessarily impinging on their ability to obtain credit and
build a credit history.”57
Regulation Z also clarified the statute’s provision on
cosigners. Cosigners can be either primarily liable on the account
or serve as guarantors.58 It states that authorized users are not
covered by the statute.59 Although several commentators have
argued that students need credit cards for purchases such as
airplane tickets, Regulation Z provides young users an easy way
to reap many of the benefits of having a credit card by allowing
students to be authorized users. Finally, Regulation Z explains
that the cosigner’s liability can terminate at age twenty-one for
all debt incurred after the young consumer turns twenty-one.60 In
addition to these changes in Regulation Z, TILA itself was
amended to require that cosigners agree in writing to any
increases in a young consumers’ credit limit.61
The central rationale for requiring that students
demonstrate an ability to repay their debts was a concern that
students were amassing substantial debt that had negative
consequences for their own lives and for society. As Part III.D
discusses in detail, members of Congress and academics
repeatedly cited high debt loans and high degrees of credit card
use as perverse outcomes from lax credit standards for young
consumers.62 Several high profile, tragic instances of students
committing suicide because of debt fueled alarm about mounting
57. Truth in Lending, 75 Fed. Reg. 7658, 7722 (Feb. 22, 2010) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
58. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.51 (2012) (stating that cosigners can either be
jointly liable or secondarily liable).
59. See id. (stating that the statute does not apply to individuals who are
under twenty-one and who are added to the account of another).
60. See id. (allowing an issuer to provide that a cosigner will not be liable
for debts incurred by the consumer incurred after the consumer reaches the age
of twenty-one).
61. See 15 U.S.C. § 1637(p) (2012) (stating that a credit limit cannot be
raised on the cosigned account of an individual under twenty-one, unless the
cosigner approves the increase in writing and accepts the joint liability for the
additional amount); 12 C.F.R. § 226.51(b)(2) (2012) (stating that, for an
individual under twenty-one who has a cosigned credit card account, the credit
limit cannot be raised before the individual reaches age twenty-one “unless the
cosigner, guarantor, or joint accountholder who assumed liability at account
opening agrees in writing to assume liability on the increase”).
62. See infra notes 113–39 and accompanying text.
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debt levels.63 Academics posited that excessive debt prevented
graduates from getting loans and sometimes jobs,64 and that it
causes great stress and poor financial well-being.65 One school
official stated that his school lost more students because of
excessive indebtedness than any other reason.66 These concerns
are particularly acute as other means for financing education
provide the most aid to the richest students.67 Part III.D assesses
this rationale.
In addition to concern about student debt loads, the Act’s
provisions relating to cosigners may be a response to parents’
complaints about harassment from creditors even when the
parents did not cosign for the debt.68 Members of Congress
expressed concern that parents ended up being unofficially liable
for their children’s debt when credit card companies allowed
students to be overextended.69
63. See Kimberly M. Gartner & Elizabeth R. Schiltz, What’s Your Score?
Educating College Students About Credit Card Debt, 24 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 401, 401–02 (2005) (“Observers have expressed concern about burgeoning
credit card debt loads which, when combined with already-high student loan
burdens, can force students into quitting college, declaring bankruptcy, and
even, in a few tragic cases, suicide.” (citations omitted)); Jekot, supra note 34, at
110–11 (giving examples of students who committed suicide because of credit
card debt).
64. See MANN, supra note 8, at 158 (“News reports explain, for example,
that high credit card debt by recent graduates often inhibits their ability to
obtain credit (for car loans or the like) and in some instances even impairs their
employability.” (citation omitted)).
65. See Norvilitis et al., Personality Factors, supra note 21, at 1396 (“High
levels of debt are related to a decreased sense of ability to manage one’s money
and lower self-esteem, as well as a decreased sense of financial well-being and
higher levels of overall stress.” (citations omitted)).
66. See Small CLAIMS, 13 COM. L. BULL., Nov.–Dec. 1998, at 6, 7 (“The
Chicago Tribune quoted Indiana University administrator John Simpson: ‘This
is a terrible thing. We lose more students to credit card debt than academic
failure.’”).
67. See Michael A. Olivas, State College Savings and Prepaid Tuition
Plans: A Reappraisal and Review, 32 J.L. & EDUC. 475, 502–03 (2003)
(describing state college payment plans as “a remarkable and remarkably
aggressive redistribution of state resources to the wealthy”).
68. See MANNING, supra note 8, at 168 (“Second, and more disconcerting,
were the harassment and even lawsuits against parents of students in default
on their credit cards—even if they had not cosigned the loan agreement.
Significantly, both of these practices persist and are major complaints of
students and their parents.” (citations omitted)).
69. See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. S5488 (daily ed. May 14, 2009) (statement of
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B. Restrictions on Marketing to Young Consumers

In addition to general concerns about students being unable
to pay their credit card debts, the CARD Act also responded to
problems that members of Congress observed about how credit
cards were being marketed to students. The Act contains
provisions about sending credit card offers to students and
handing out tangible gifts on college campuses.
1. Prescreened Mail Offers
Through an amendment to the FCRA, the CARD Act
attempts to discourage credit card companies from mailing young
consumers credit card offers by forbidding credit reporting
agencies from providing issuers credit reports for people under
twenty-one, unless the young consumer consents.70 The Act does
not directly forbid sending credit card offers, but instead it
attempts to stop the practice indirectly by choking off a source of
information for credit card companies.
Before the CARD Act, academic research had established
that college students frequently received credit card offers.
Indeed, the “preferred marketing technique for potential
customers was direct mail.”71 One study found that 69% of
students surveyed reported receiving a credit card offer in the
mail in the prior week;72 another claimed that students receive
Sen. Claire McCaskill) (“They send these cards to kids because they know their
parents, if they are in college, don’t want them to get into trouble and they will
bail them out if they get in too deep.”).
70. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(c)(1)(B)(iv) (2012) (stating that, for transactions
not initiated by the consumer, a consumer reporting agency cannot furnish a
consumer report for use in extending credit or insurance if the report shows the
consumer is under twenty-one, unless the consumer consents).
71. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 36, at 6.
72. See Norvilitis et al., Factors Influencing Debt Levels, supra note 21, at
941 (“In the week prior to the survey, 69% . . . of students received at least one
credit-card offer.”). Other studies found lower levels, such as one study’s finding
that only 37% of student cardholders received their applications in the mail. See
Jacquelyn Warwick & Phylis Mansfield, Credit Card Consumers: College
Students’ Knowledge and Attitude, 17 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 617, 621 (2000)
(finding that 37% of respondents with credit cards received the application
through direct mail).
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twenty-five to fifty card solicitations a semester.73 High credit
card utilization was directly caused, studies reported, by
aggressive marketing: “The majority of college students who own
credit cards do not actively seek them out, but are aggressively
pursued through the mail and on-campus by credit card
issuers.”74 Another study found:
Financially at-risk students are more likely than other
students to acquire their credit card(s) through a mail
application, at a retail store, and/or at a campus table. These
findings suggest that aggressive marketing practices by credit
card companies to target college students (i.e., mass mailings,
retail store discounts, and credit card representatives on
campus) have likely contributed to the recent rise in credit
card debt on college campuses putting some students at more
financial risk than others.75

Credit card companies have a strong incentive to capture the
student credit card market because students tend to continue
using the account they opened in college,76 and academics have
raised the concern that allowing students to have credit cards
normalizes and routinizes paying with credit.77
Members of Congress were outraged that young consumers
received credit card offers in the mail. For instance, Senator
Menendez pointed out that he knew a two-year-old child who had
received an offer for a credit card and that his own children
received an “incredible number of preapproved credit cards.”78
73. See Wood, supra note 9, at 163 (“This heavy marketing is demonstrated
by the twenty-five to fifty credit card solicitations students receive per
semester.” (citation omitted)).
74. Warwick & Mansfield, supra note 72, at 623.
75. Lyons, supra note 23, at 73.
76. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 36, at 4, 35 (stating that
some issuers “marketed to college students because they viewed them as good
customers who would continue using the issuers’ credit cards in a responsible
way” and that many college students will earn higher incomes and be profitable
credit card customers after they graduate).
77. See MANN, supra note 8, at 45–49 (describing the psychology of
payment with credit cards as compared with other payment methods).
78. See 155 CONG. REC. S5410 (daily ed. May 13, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Robert Menendez) (recalling seeing his children, “when they were in college and
studying but not working, get an incredible number of preapproved credit cards”
and mentioning his “State director’s 2-year-old who got a preapproved credit
card”); see also 155 CONG. REC. S5548 (daily ed. May 18, 2009) (statement of
Sen. Byron Dorgan) (criticizing companies for offering cards to very young
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Similarly, a Representative reported his thirteen-year-old son
had received credit card offers.79
2. Tangible Gifts on Campus
In addition to changing the FCRA, Congress amended the
TILA to forbid issuers from offering tangible gifts to students on
or near campus or at student events in exchange for filling out a
credit card application.80 The Federal Reserve has offered a
variety of clarifications to this simple rule, explaining that on or
near campus means within 1,000 feet of the campus; that a
“tangible item includes any physical item” but not “non-physical
inducements such as discounts, rewards points, or promotional
credit terms;” that issuers can give tangible gifts as long as they
also give them to those not filling out applications;81 and that the
prohibition applies to consumers under twenty-one and those
over twenty-one if they are students.82
Academics have expressed concern that colleges have
permitted and even endorsed credit card marketing.83 One study
demonstrated that students who obtained a credit card through
consumers).
79. See 155 CONG. REC. H4964 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 2009) (statement of Rep.
Keith Ellison) (“Let me say that I knew that we had a problem in America when
my 19-year-old son . . . kept getting solicitations for credit cards; but I was quite
convinced . . . when my 13-year-old son . . . started getting credit card
solicitations.”).
80. See 15 U.S.C. § 1650(f)(2) (2011) (prohibiting card issuers and creditors
from offering to “a student at an institution of higher education any tangible
item to induce such student to apply for or participate in an open end consumer
credit plan,” whether on campus, near campus, or at a school-sponsored event).
81. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.57(c) (2012) (clarifying the terms “tangible item,”
“inducement,” “near campus,” and “related event,” requiring that the creditor
take steps to determine whether someone is a student, and making clear that
mailings are included in the prohibition).
82. See Truth in Lending, 75 Fed. Reg. 7658, 7756 (Feb. 22, 2010) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) (stating that the definition of college student “is
intended to be broad and would apply to students of any age attending an
institution of higher education and applies to all students, including those
enrolled in graduate programs or joint degree programs”).
83. See MANN, supra note 8, at 157 (“[I]t is plain that in many cases the
marketing proceeds with the approval of the university administrators, who
voluntarily permit issuers to implement card-issuance programs directly on
university campuses.” (citation omitted)).
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on-campus marketing had higher debt-to-income ratios and that
students often believed that their college had screened creditors
who were allowed to market on campus.84 Academics argued that
young consumers are more responsive to truthful-but-incomplete
advertising85 and that college credit card marketing tactics
overshadowed the TILA disclosures.86
Members of Congress have echoed the fears of academics,
stating that gifts preyed on “vulnerable” college students87 and
that issuers aggressively preyed on students.88 One member of
Congress went even further than researchers and claimed that
84. See Norvilitis et al., Factors Influencing Debt Levels, supra note 21, at
941 (finding that students who received credit cards from the student union had
higher debt-to-income ratios than those who got credit cards elsewhere, and that
most students believed the school evaluated companies soliciting students in the
union).
85. See Laurie A. Lucas, Integrative Social Contracts Theory: Ethical
Implications of Marketing Credit Cards to U.S. College Students, 38 AM. BUS.
L.J. 413, 422–23 (2001) (discussing what qualifies as deceptive advertising and
arguing that college students “lack sophistication and therefore deserve special
protection in relation to credit”).
[Additionally], most of the concern about college credit cards is not
about credit terms that rise to this level of deception or unfairness.
Rather, the concern is about offering credit to people who might not
understand the dangers of such credit at a time in their lives when
they are unlikely to currently have sufficient income to keep the debt
from escalating at high interest rates.
Gartner & Schiltz, supra note 63, at 410.
86. See Lucas, supra note 85, at 414–15 (describing an increased emphasis
on promotional disclosures instead of on TILA disclosures).
[T]he specific practice of target marketing to U.S. college students
using credit card solicitations . . . de-emphasize[s] the disclosures
required under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). Many such
solicitations instead emphasize other promotional materials—like
celebrity endorsements or offers of prizes, gifts or discounts—and
have reduced the size of the required disclosures, or included them in
inserts, in order to fit the promotional material in the text of the
solicitation . . . .
87. See 155 CONG. REC. H5011 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Rep.
Steve Cohen) (“College students are most vulnerable and shouldn’t be lured to
credit cards at an early age and put into even more debt than student loans do
by offering prizes and gifts.”).
88. See 155 CONG. REC. E1033 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Rep.
John Lewis) (“Credit card companies aggressively prey on our young college
students who are not yet working. These companies rove college campuses and
entice students with gifts, with the intent of collecting interest payments as the
student ravels herself in debt.”).
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the marketing techniques were deceptive.89 Like the ability-torepay requirement, however, the fundamental concern about
marketing both through mailed offers and campus advertising
was the high level of student debt that these practices ultimately
created.90
C. College–Issuer Marketing Agreements
In addition to restrictions on who can obtain credit cards and
how issuers can market those cards, the CARD Act also took aim
at the relationship between credit card companies and colleges
and organizations related to colleges. This subpart describes this
part of the CARD Act and uses the study of college–issuer
agreements to empirically evaluate the justifications offered for
it.
1. The Provision and Its Rationale
The CARD Act requires institutions of higher education to
“publicly disclose any contract or other agreement made with a
card issuer or creditor for the purpose of marketing a credit
card.”91 In addition to colleges publicly disclosing these
agreements, credit card companies are required to provide to
Congress any agreements they have with colleges.92 This
obligation requires disclosure of agreements beyond just those
that market cards to young consumers, as long as students are
possible targets. The Federal Reserve has clarified: “An
agreement may qualify as a college credit card agreement even if
marketing of cards under the agreement is targeted at alumni,
89. See 155 CONG. REC. S5474 (daily ed. May 14, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Sherrod Brown) (“[M]any credit card companies flood campuses with deceptive
advertising and hidden fees and penalties and unscrupulous practices.”).
90. See Nelson, Young Consumer Protection, supra note 9, at 375
(describing the CARD Act as a recent effort by lawmakers “to address young
consumers’ escalating indebtedness”); id. at 396–97 (stating a great concern of
lawmakers enacting the CARD Act was the “detrimental consequences due
to . . . accumulation of credit card debt” by college students).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1650(f)(1) (2011).
92. See id. § 1637(r)(2) (requiring each creditor to submit an annual report
describing all college agreements and explaining the details of such reports).
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faculty, staff, and other nonstudent consumers, as long as cards
may also be issued to students in connection with the
agreement.”93
Several academics have argued that agreements between
colleges and credit card companies have engendered students’
debt problems. Because of the financial incentives credit card
issuers offer to schools and university officials, academics have
argued that college administrations were willing to lead their
students into debt to capture the issuers’ incentives.94 As Robert
Manning argues:
This Faustian pact includes sponsoring school programs,
funding student activities, renting on-campus solicitation
tables, and paying “kickbacks” for exclusive marketing
agreements such as college or alumni affinity credit cards. As
a result, rather than protecting the economic and educational
interests of their students, college administrators are playing
an active and often disingenuous role in promoting the societal
acceptance of consumer debt as well as the prominence of
credit cards in college life.95

From the college’s perspective, some researchers argued, it is
better for students to be in debt.96 Similarly, members of
Congress believed that the relationship between credit card
companies and universities led to perverse incentives to facilitate
debt.97
Members of Congress also emphasized the importance of this
provision to provide “transparency in university marketing deals
with credit card issuers.”98 Senator Feinstein went further,
93. Truth in Lending, 75 Fed. Reg. 7658, 7756 (Feb. 22, 2010) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
94. See MANNING, supra note 8, at 162 (“[M]any college administrators are
willing to sacrifice the long-term interests of their students and their
institutions for the short-term financial inducements of the credit card
industry.” (citation omitted)).
95. Id. at 192.
96. See Roberts & Jones, supra note 21, at 234 (describing how a school
earns money from credit cards on campus and stating that “it is now in the
school’s best interest for its students to be in debt”).
97. See 155 CONG. REC. H5020 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Rep.
Jeff Duncan) (“[M]any universities . . . have entered into deals with credit card
companies, and now they are not only encouraging students to incur huge
student loan debts, they’re encouraging students to incur credit card debts.”).
98. 155 CONG. REC. S5493 (daily ed. May 14, 2009) (statement of Sen.
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arguing that requiring transparency may “act as a deterrent to
deals with highly unfavorable terms for students.”99 Part IV.C
uses my study of 300 of these college–issuer agreements to
evaluate whether this prediction materialized. The CARD Act’s
disclosure requirement is a significant change because attempts
to obtain information about these agreements were stymied in
the past because the agreements forbid the parties from
disclosing their terms.100
2. Assessing the Rationale for the College–Issuer Disclosures
Because the CARD Act requires issuers and college-related
entities to disclose their agreements, we now have the information
needed to see whether this disclosure requirement was justified in
the first place. The information we obtained from our sample of
300 agreements suggests that some of the concerns animating the
disclosure requirement were justified. On the other hand, our
findings suggest that other concerns appear to be overstated.
First, concerns about college-related entities promoting
student use of credit cards are well-founded. The agreements
envision, for the most part, students obtaining credit cards because
of the agreements. Of all the agreements, 72.67% include student
cards, while the remaining 27.33% are aimed exclusively at alumni
or other groups.
In addition, the agreements create an easy mechanism for
issuers to use to reach students. Many of the agreements, 68.33%,
require that the college-related entity provide a list of mailing
addresses for students. This percentage is significantly higher
than information reported before the CARD Act disclosures.101 An
Dianne Feinstein); see also 155 CONG. REC. E1035 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009)
(statement of Rep. Thomas Petri) (“Despite the fact that hundreds of schools
throughout the country have such arrangements, very little is known about
them . . . . This bill simply seeks greater transparency by requiring credit card
companies to report these arrangements.”).
99. 155 CONG. REC. S5493 (daily ed. May 14, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Dianne Feinstein).
100. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 36, at 30 (describing how
attempts to uncover information about credit card college–issuer agreements
failed because alumni association officials stated that “their contracts with the
credit card issuers precluded disclosure of the terms and conditions”).
101. See CHERYL HYSTAD & BRAD HEAVNER, GRADUATING INTO DEBT: CREDIT
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agreement between Dickinson College (DC) and MBNA America
provides a common, albeit circuitous, provision. It states: “Upon
the request of MBNA America, DC shall provide MBNA America
with [m]ailing [l]ists free of any charge.”102 Mailing lists are
defined as “updated and current lists and/or magnetic tapes (in a
format designated by MBNA America) containing names, postal
addresses and, when available, telephone numbers of [m]embers
segmented by zip codes or reasonably selected membership
characteristics.”103 The definition of “members” explicitly includes
students: “‘Member’ means undergraduate students, graduate
students, alumni of Dickinson College and/or other potential
participants mutually agreed to by DC and MBNA America.”104
Thus, while the agreement does not come out and say so, it
requires the college to provide students’ addresses to the credit
card issuer.
In addition to student mailing lists, the agreements provide
issuers with other advertising rights. Around half of the
agreements, 47.33% (n=142), did not list any specific advertising
the entity would provide or participate in. For the other half, Table
3 outlines the specific advertising arrangements between issuers
and college-related entities.

CARD MARKETING ON MARYLAND COLLEGE CAMPUSES 8–9 (2004), available at
http://www.marylandconsumers.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=x4_rQermn7Y%3
d&tabid=72 (reporting two of twelve schools interviewed admitted they sold
student information to credit card companies and three of twelve schools
surveyed sold a student list in some form).
102. Credit Card Agreement, Dickinson C.-MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., § 2(e),
Aug. 6, 1996, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/CreditCardAgreements
Content/CollegeAgreement_253.pdf.
103. Id. § 1(e).
104. Id. § 1(f). In the other 31.67% of the agreements, the addresses on
mailing lists are limited to nonstudents. Alabama State University’s (ASU’s)
agreement, for instance, states:
ASU shall provide the initial [m]ailing [l]ist, containing at least thirty
thousand (30,000) non-duplicate alumni names (of persons at least
eighteen years of age) as well as additional names of donors and
parents of students, with corresponding valid postal addresses and,
when available, telephone numbers and e-mail addresses of Alumni
Members as soon as possible but no later than thirty (30) days after
ASU’s execution of this Agreement.
Alabama State University Affinity Agreement, supra note 50, § 2(e).
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Table 3: Advertising Arrangements Between Issuers and CollegeRelated Entities
Percentage of
Agreements with
Advertising
Details105

Number of
Agreements

Issuer permitted to advertise
on entity’s website

90.51%

143

Issuer permitted to solicit
customers and/or have
advertisements at sporting
events or other major events

29.11%

46

College-related entity will
send e-mails recommending
the issuer

8.86%

14

College-related entity will
include credit card
applications in organization
magazines, newspapers or enewsletters

3.80%

6

Issuer will provide credit
education on campus (e.g., in
student welcome kits, at
orientation events, in the
student newspaper or in the
campus book store)

2.53%

4

(n=158)

In addition to the arrangements in Table 3, two agreements
stated that the college-related entity would place banner
advertisements for issuers, two stated that the issuer would be
promoted in materials at the alumni office or at alumni meetings,
and one stated that the issuer could place information in store
publications. Yale University’s agreement with Chase Bank USA
provides an example of the two most common provisions:
Yale shall prominently place a jpeg image with an associated
hyperlink above the fold on the homepage, and shall use
105. These percentages add up to more than 100% because some agreements
provided issuers with multiple advertising rights.
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reasonable efforts to obtain placement on the checkout or
point-of-sale pages, if any, of the Association of Yale Alumni
(AYA) Web site (www.aya.yale.edu), and shall prominently
place a link on the sponsor page of the Yale Athletics Web
site . . . .106
Consistent with Schedule 3(a), Yale shall also provide or cause
to be provided to Chase, at no cost to Chase, with access to
each Yale home athletic event identified on Schedule 3(a) to
market the Program . . . . Yale shall provide a location that is
prominent with respect to visibility and pedestrian foot
traffic.107

Based on the fact that most agreements are aimed at putting
credit cards in the hands of students and that most agreements
actively involve the school in distributing the means for
advertising those cards, policymakers’ concerns about the
entanglement of college-related entities and credit card issuers
appear justified.
Yet, in some ways, the agreements are not as problematic as
people imagined. First, the terms outlined in the agreements do
not have the most abusive characteristics critics associate with
credit cards. For instance, none of the 300 agreements we
reviewed created cards with teaser rates, a common credit card
snare that consumer advocates and academics criticize.108
Additionally, the rates established by the agreement are not
extremely high considering the nonexistent credit histories of
many students. The median rate in our sample was 13.15%, but
most credit cards have much higher effective rates, especially for
poor credit risks.109
Second, the agreements do, for the most part, give the school
the right to approve of any advertising the issuer does pursuant
to the agreement. Again, Alabama State University’s affinity
106. Affinity Bankcard Agreement, Chase Bank USA, N.A.-Yale U, § 4(b),
Aug. 19, 2007, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/CreditCard
AgreementsContent/CollegeAgreement_1009.pdf.
107. Id. § 4(c).
108. Teaser rates are short-term introductory interest rates. See generally
Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1392–93 (2004).
109. See MANN, supra note 8, at 190 (stating that higher-risk, higherdefault-rate borrowers often have higher interest rates); MANNING, supra note 8,
at 218 (citing some examples of credit card interest rates, including 19.8 APR
and 21.9 APR).
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agreement provides a common example: “ASU shall have the
right of prior approval of all [p]rogram advertising and
solicitation materials to be used by MBNA America, which
contain ASU’s [t]rademark; such approval shall not be
unreasonably withheld or delayed.”110 Most of the agreements,
96.00% (n=288), contained a provision giving the school-related
entity the right to approve ads, while the remaining 12
agreements simply did not address approval of advertising. As
long as college-related entities exercise strong judgment in
approving advertisements, these provisions provide a check on
abusive marketing behavior.
Third, and most importantly, the relatively small amount of
money paid to each college-related entity undermines one of the
key rationales behind requiring disclosures by colleges. Prior
research, which did not have the benefit of the disclosures
required by the CARD Act, appears to have overstated the extent
to which colleges have benefitted from marketing agreements.
Based on the Federal Reserve System’s aggregation of the data
provided by issuers in 2009,111 604 of the college-related entities,
or 57.85%, made less than $10,000 under their agreements with
issuers, with 219 making less than $1,000 and 99 making no
money at all. The median payment amount was $5,891. Thus, for
most organizations, their agreement with the issuer had a
negligible effect on their bottom line. If it is true that credit card
debt causes students to withdraw from school and cease paying
tuition,112 it seems most schools have a lot more to lose if students
are over-indebted than they have to gain by encouraging students
to use credit cards.
For a small minority of entities, however, the agreements
were lucrative. In 2009, 143 entities made more than $100,000
from their arrangement with issuers, and 25 entities obtained
even more than $1,000,000. For these schools, it appears there
may be an incentive to encourage credit card use. Overall,
110. Alabama State University Affinity Agreement, supra note 50, § 2(d).
111. The figures in the remainder of this section are all based on my
analysis of the Federal Reserve’s spreadsheet. See FRB 2009 Full Data
Spreadsheet, supra note 43.
112. See Small CLAIMS, supra note 66, at 7 (“This is a terrible thing. We
lose more students to credit card debt than academic failure.” (quoting an
Indiana University administrator)).
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however, the data from the Federal Reserve indicate that the link
between college–issuer agreements and over-indebtedness is not
as clear as prior research had supposed.
Along these same lines, it appears that most agreements did
not result in a substantial number of credit card accounts being
opened. Of all the agreements, 87.36% (n=912 of 1044) of the
agreements resulted in fewer than 100 new credit card accounts
being opened. The median number of cards opened pursuant to
an agreement was 14. These data demonstrate that the idea that
these agreements were causing students at most schools to open
accounts and take on excessive debt is not true. The next section
takes up the other key rationale behind the CARD Act—excessive
student credit card debt.
D. Misplaced Reliance on Credit Card Usage and Debt Levels
The primary motivating factor behind each of the young
consumer provisions was the belief that students were incurring
substantial debt loads that caused them to experience financial
distress. A large part of the basis for this concern is a series of
studies113 by Sallie Mae, a financial services organization focused
on education,114 and Nellie Mae, a Sallie Mae subsidiary, which
113. Nellie Mae began producing reports in 1998, but then Sallie Mae took
over. Together, they have produced five reports. For the most recent report, see
SALLIE MAE, HOW UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS USE CREDIT CARDS: SALLIE MAE’S
NATIONAL STUDY OF USAGE RATES AND TRENDS 2009 [hereinafter SALLIE MAE
STUDY], available at http://www.salliemae.com/NR/rdonlyres/0BD600F1-937746EA-AB1F-6061FC763246/10744/SLMCreditCardUsageStudy41309FINAL2.
pdf.
114. See id. at 2 (describing Sallie Mae); see also Sallie Mae, Corporate
Overview, https://www1.salliemae.com/about/corp_leadership (last visited Sept.
24, 2012) (“Sallie Mae (NASDAQ: SLM) is the nation’s No. 1 financial services
company specializing in education . . . . Sallie Mae turns education dreams into
reality for its 25 million customers.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
Sallie Mae is the nation’s leading provider of saving- and paying-forcollege programs. The company manages $180 billion in educational
loans and serves 10 million student and parent customers. Through
its . . . affiliates, the company also manages more than $17.5 billion in
529 college-savings plans, and is a major, private source of college
funding contributions in America with 10 million members and more
than $475 million in member rewards.
SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 113, at 2.
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focuses on student loans.115 This subpart outlines the findings of
the Sallie Mae/Nellie Mae studies, focusing on the most recent
study, and explores how academics, the press, and policymakers
commonly misused those findings.
The concern over the Sallie Mae/Nellie Mae studies might
appear parochial or merely interesting to academics only, but it is
not. Every day when a member of Congress argued for the CARD
Act’s young consumer provisions, they appealed to the figures in
these studies116 (except one instance when the young consumer
provisions were just mentioned in passing).117 It is hard to
overstate the extent to which these reports have been misused.
Although there are some differences, the most recent Sallie
Mae study is similar in most ways to the prior reports from Nellie
Mae.118 In the most recent study, Sallie Mae pulled data from
1,200 credit bureau reports of students who had applied for
private student loans with Nellie Mae or Sallie Mae.119 The Sallie
Mae study finds that many students who apply for private loans
have credit cards and that many of these students have high debt
loads:
115. See SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 113, at 2 (“Since 1982, Nellie Mae
has focused exclusively on providing education financing for undergraduate and
graduate students and families, through the Federal Family Education Loan
Program and through privately funded loans . . . . Nellie Mae is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of SLM Corporation, commonly known as Sallie Mae.”); see also
Nellie Mae, About Us, http://nelliemae.com/aboutus (last visited Sept. 24, 2009)
(providing background on the company) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
116. See 155 CONG. REC. S5469 (daily ed. May 14, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Byron Dorgan) (citing to statistics from the Sallie Mae/Nellie Mae study); 155
CONG. REC. S5411 (daily ed. May 13, 2009) (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd)
(citing to statistics from the study); 155 CONG. REC. S5316 (daily ed. May 11,
2009) (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd) (citing to statistics from the study);
155 CONG. REC. H5020 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Rep. Louise
Slaughter) (citing to statistics from the study); 155 CONG. REC. S3552–53 (daily
ed. Mar. 19, 2009) (statement of Sen. Patrick Murray) (citing to statistics from
the study and introducing into the record a newspaper article that discussed
similar figures); 155 CONG. REC. S175 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Herb Kohl) (citing to statistics from the study).
117. See 155 CONG. REC. S5549 (daily ed. May 18, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Byron Dorgan) (discussing the young consumer provision in 112 words).
118. See SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 113, at 4 (explaining the differences
between the current and prior reports).
119. See id. at 19 (explaining the study’s methodology, including the sample
group).
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Eighty-four percent of this student population overall have
credit cards, an increase of approximately 11 percent since the
fall of 2004, the last time the undergraduate study was
conducted . . . . Data collected in March 2008 show that the
average (mean) amount of debt carried by undergraduate
student cardholders increased from 2004 by 46 percent to
$3,173. During the same time period, median debt increased
by 74 percent to $1,645. The average number of cards carried
per cardholder, those carrying four or more cards, and those
with balances in the $3,000 to $7,000 range also increased.120

Based on these numbers, the study concludes that “[i]n this time
of credit crunch and economic downturn, college students are
relying on credit cards more than ever before.”121
There are two problems with how the Nellie Mae/Sallie Mae
data are commonly used, the first of which has been suggested by
other researchers and the second of which I raise here for the
first time.122 First, as others have noted, the Nellie Mae/Sallie
Mae studies only reflect a small, unique group of students, not
college students generally.123 The studies used the credit reports
of students who applied for private student loans, not even the
government-subsidized loans to which most students turn first to
finance their education.124 It is not a stretch to think that this
group would have higher debt loads than the general population
of college students because students apply for private student
loans when government-subsidized loans are insufficient.125 A
120. Id. at 5.
121. Id. at 3.
122. These studies have been significantly misused, but this misuse does not
reflect negatively on the Nellie Mae/Sallie Mae studies themselves, which note
the methodological limitations. See, e.g., id. at 5 (“Eighty-four percent of this
student population overall have credit cards . . . .” (emphasis added)).
123. Staten & Barron, supra note 22, at 11 n.17.
Although the Nellie Mae study was based on actual credit report data
for its sample of students, the sample itself was biased. Students in
the sample were applying for a special type of student loan because
they did not qualify for more conventional student loans due to either
excessive debt or incomes that exceeded qualifying thresholds.
124. See SALLIE MAE & GALLUP, HOW AMERICA PAYS FOR COLLEGE 42 (2010),
available at https://www1.salliemae.com/NR/rdonlyres/D5D78A1C-BBB8-4D97AE9B-7EC35558AD5F/13388/SLMGallupReportHowAmericaPaysforCollege810
10FINAL.pdf (noting that 28% of students pay for college with federal student
loans but only 13% pay using private student loans).
125. See Staten & Barron, supra note 22, at 11 n.17 (“Students in the
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separate study Sallie Mae and Gallup conducted, which was
representative of all college students, found that only 13% of
students borrowed using private student loans.126 More
significantly, students borrowing private loans reported “a higher
average cost of attendance compared to other borrowers,”127 and
all students who borrowed “were more likely to attend four-year
schools.”128 Both of these characteristics of private borrowers
increase the pressure to pay for expenses with credit cards.
This pressure to use credit cards to pay higher education
expenses is revealed by the average amount of credit card debt
used to pay for two-year versus four-year colleges. Student credit
cards accounted for $70 of the debt for two-year public schools,
$86 of the debt for public four-year colleges, and $200 of the debt
for private four-year colleges.129 Thus, it is very likely that Sallie
Mae’s student debt levels are higher than the typical college
student’s debt levels, thereby reflecting only a small subset of
college students, not students generally.
A second concern that has escaped the attention of prior
commentators is that Nellie Mae and Sallie Mae include together
all debt that the student and any cosigners owe in “student debt
levels,” not just the debt that the student individually owes. If a
parent adds a student to one of the parent’s existing credit card
accounts when the student leaves for college, the Nellie
Mae/Sallie Mae studies would count the parent’s entire credit
balance on that card as a “student debt” in its study because that
debt shows up on the student’s credit report as a current
obligation.130

sample were applying for a special type of student loan because they did not
qualify for more conventional student loans due to either excessive debt or
incomes that exceeded qualifying thresholds.”).
126. See SALLIE MAE & GALLUP, supra note 124, at 42.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 26 tbl.2c.
130. See e-mail from Patricia Christel, Vice President, Corporate Commc’ns,
Sallie Mae, to Jim Hawkins, Assistant Professor of Law, Univ. of Hous. Law
Ctr. (Jan. 3, 2011) (explaining the process by which the study’s credit card debt
figures are taken directly from students’ credit reports and stating that these
figures are generally higher than the debt levels self-reported by students) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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The exact effect of including cosigner debts is not known, but
we do know that some parents deal with student credit cards by
adding students to the parents’ accounts.131 If a parent with a
$15,000 balance on a credit card adds a new student to the
account, most people would not consider the student’s credit card
debt load to be $15,000, but that is how the Nellie Mae/Sallie Mae
studies characterize the debt. Like using a subset of college
students who applied for private loans, this inclusion of cosigner
debts has the potential to artificially inflate student debt levels in
the studies.
The surveys I conducted at the University of Houston and
Baylor University yielded very different results than the Nellie
Mae/Sallie Mae studies. My study did not attempt to be
nationally representative,132 so it also does not offer definitive
proof about levels of credit card use or debt among all college
students.133 Still, the fact that my study, which drew from all
undergraduate students, generated such divergent results
indicates that the driving factor behind Sallie Mae’s high credit
card use and debt levels is a limited sample. Figure 3 contrasts
the number of students with a credit card in the Sallie Mae study
with the Houston/Baylor surveys.

131. See, e.g., Gabe Albarian, How Can College Students Avoid Credit
Hassles? Expert Reveals Secrets to Establishing and Keeping Good Credit,
MARKETWIRE (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/howcan-college-students-avoid-credit-hassles-1561884.htm (last visited Sept. 24,
2012) (suggesting that students should be added to parents’ accounts until the
students can accumulate sufficient credit history) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
132. See supra Part II.A (describing the study’s sample).
133. In another nationally representative study, however, Troy Adams and
Monique Moore found that “[o]nly 8.2% and 5% [of more than 45,000 students]
had a credit card balance of $1,000 to $2,999 or a balance of $3,000 or more,
respectively.” Adams & Moore, supra note 16, at 103.
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Figure 3: Comparison of Number of Students with Credit Cards
Between Sallie Mae and Houston/Baylor Surveys
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Similarly, Table 4 compares Sallie Mae’s data about debt levels
with the data from the Houston/Baylor study.
Table 4: Comparison of Credit Card Debt Levels Between Sallie
Mae and Houston/Baylor Studies

Freshman
Credit
Card Debt
Average
Debt of
Seniors
Who Carry
Credit
Card

Sallie
Mae134

Totals from
Houston/Baylor
Survey

Univ. of
Houston

Baylor
Univ.

Median
debt was
$939

91.04% had
$0–$500 in debt

92.20% had
$0–$500 in
debt

90.47% had
$0–$500 in
debt

45.76%
(n=27) had $0–
$500 in debt and

43.14%
(n=22) had
$0–$500 in
debt and

62.50% (n=5)
had $0–$500
in debt and

15.25%
(n=9) had over
$3,000 in debt

13.73%
(n=7) had
over $3,000
in debt

25.00% (n=2)
had over
$3,000 in
debt

$4,100

These results are consistent with the observation that
students at private schools are more likely to have credit cards
134. The data in this table has been compiled from the Sallie Mae report.
See SALLIE MAE STUDY, supra note 113, at 3, 8 (providing the median freshman
credit card debt and the average debt of graduating seniors who are
cardholders).
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and higher debt loads.135 But, in every case, my survey found
significantly lower debt levels than Sallie Mae’s report.
Academics, the media, and consumer advocates have
repeatedly misused the data when making arguments in favor of
specific regulatory reforms. More alarming, however, is the fact
that every time a member of Congress mentioned the Sallie Mae
study in conjunction with arguments for the CARD Act’s young
consumer provisions, the member inappropriately used the
findings as representative of all college students.136
This chronic misuse of the Nellie Mae/Sallie Mae studies
needs to be corrected to ensure that optimal student-card policies
are enacted. By pointing out the inaccuracies in the ways that
academics and legislators currently use the studies, I do not
intend to show that student credit cards are benign. Indeed, I
have argued at length elsewhere that credit cards cause financial
135. See Manning & Kirshak, supra note 35, at 41 (“The highest proportions
[of students with credit cards] are at more affluent, private universities and the
lowest in predominantly minority colleges and public universities that enroll
high percentages of students from lower income households.”). But see Norvilitis
et al., Personality Factors, supra note 21, at 1404 (reporting students in that
study at state schools had higher debt loads than students at private schools).
136. To locate instances where members of Congress used the Nellie
Mae/Sallie Mae studies in conjunction with the CARD Act, I searched Westlaw’s
“Congressional Record” database using the follow search command on January
21, 2012: “(sallie-mae or nellie-mae) /50 credit-card”. It generated twenty-six
results, but only five results involved the CARD Act; the other twenty-one were
about other issues. In each case, the member of Congress misrepresented the
studies’ findings. See 155 CONG. REC. H5814 (daily ed. May 20, 2009) (statement
of Rep. Earl Blumenauer) (“A recent Sallie Mae survey indicated that 84% of
undergraduates had at least one credit card and that, on average, students have
4.6 credit cards.”); 155 CONG. REC. S5493 (daily ed. May 14, 2009) (statements of
Sen. Dianne Feinstein) (stating a number of figures from the Sallie Mae report
as though they represent all students and using them as evidence of a need for
Congress to take action); 155 CONG. REC. S5316 (daily ed. May 11, 2009)
(statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd) (“According to Sallie Mae, college students
graduate with an average credit card debt of more than $4,000. That is up from
$2,900 just 4 years ago. Nearly 20 percent of college students have credit card
balances of over $7,000.”); 155 CONG. REC. H5020 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009)
(statement of Rep. Louise Slaughter) (stating a number of Sallie Mae statistics
as though they represent all students and rationalizing credit card debt as a
reason for an increase in bankruptcy filings among young people); 155 CONG.
REC. E1026 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Rep. Patrick Murphy)
(blaming college credit card agreements for students’ “racking up debts that can
take years to pay off,” and citing a “recent Sallie Mae study” as proof that
graduating seniors have, on average, “more than $4,100 in credit card debt”).
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distress.137 Yet, if we really want to protect students who use
credit cards, we need to use the information appropriately. Also,
if legislators have incorrect beliefs about the sources of student
debt problems, they may enact policies aimed at the wrong credit
vehicles. For instance, perhaps if legislators had better data on
the true amount of credit card debt, they would focus more
attention on reforming student loans.138 Additionally, with a
better understanding of debt loads, policymakers might be able to
determine the average optimal amount of credit card debt for
students and enact rules that limit balances at those levels.139
IV. Measuring the Effectiveness of the CARD Act’s Young
Consumer Provisions
The prior Part explored the pre-CARD Act era—the reasons
for the CARD Act’s young consumer provisions, the flaws in those
rationales, and the provisions themselves. This Part looks at the
world after the CARD Act and reports data that measure the
effects of the CARD Act for each of its provisions.
A. The Effects of the Ability-to-Pay Provision
The provisions requiring credit card companies to evaluate
young consumers’ abilities to repay their debt have generated a
variety of predictions. Some people have claimed that the CARD
Act will eliminate access to credit because its ability-to-repay
137. See generally Jim Hawkins, Regulating on the Fringe: Reexamining the
Link Between Fringe Banking and Financial Distress, 86 IND. L.J. 1361 (2011)
(surveying the evidence that links credit cards and financial distress).
138. See Tamar Lewin, Student Loan Default Rates Rise Sharply in Past
Year, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2011, at A14 (detailing an increase in student loan
default rates from 7% to 8.8% in a single year).
139. Congresswoman Louise Slaughter offered an amendment to the CARD
Act with caps on the amount of debt students could accumulate, but these
amendments did not make it into the final Act. See Bill Swindell, House Close
To Passage Of Maloney Credit Card Measure, NAT’L JS. CONGRESS DAILY, Apr.
30, 2009, at 6 (describing Maloney’s and Slaughter’s proposed amendments, and
explaining that Slaughter’s amendment would set standards for underwriting
student cards, including limiting the available credit to the greater of 20% of
income or $500 per month).
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standard is too strict.140 Others, however, have asserted that the
Act will not stop anyone who wants a credit card from obtaining
one because the standards are too lenient.141 This section
analyzes these and other predictions with the findings of my
student surveys. My research resolves this apparent
contradiction in the current literature on ability to repay by
revealing how the CARD Act’s standards appear strict but
actually contain many loopholes that students have discovered
and exploited. I discovered that students have found creative
ways to avoid the strictures of the independent-ability-to-pay
provisions, although they have not enlisted peers as cosigners as
many observers expected.
According to the survey results, not many students under the
age of twenty-one had applied for a card since the beginning of
the school year, creating a relatively small sample size in this
limited demographic. Of the total sample of students under
twenty-one, 11.05% (n=44) had applied for a card in the semester
before the survey was taken. Three students erroneously failed to
complete the detailed questions about their application, leaving
forty-one students. Of those forty-one students, 56.09% (n=23)
applied by themselves, and 43.90% (n=18) applied with a
cosigner. Although the sample size is small, the results are
interesting and touch on many of the empirical questions debated
among the CARD Act’s opponents and proponents.
1. Qualifying as an Individual
the

Scholars raised a variety of concerns about loopholes around
provisions requiring young consumers to show an

140. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 424 (“The upshot is that independently
wealthy eighteen-year-olds, or those whose parents are willing and able to
accept joint liability, will still be able to obtain a credit card. But poor and
middle-income applicants may not.” (citation omitted)); Wood, supra note 9, at
172–74 (arguing that the standards for ability to repay are more stringent on
those under twenty-one than on those over twenty-one and, therefore, this will
prevent young consumers from building credit histories).
141. See Nelson, Young Consumer Protection, supra note 9, at 402–03
(“Considering the likelihood that young consumers will have little trouble
meeting the CARD Act’s eligibility requirements as interpreted by the Federal
Reserve Board, the door remains open for college-aged consumers to continue
amassing significant amounts of debt.”).
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independent ability to repay the debt if they apply by themselves,
and responses to my survey indicate those concerns were valid.
Part of the problem is that the concept of a student’s “income”
eludes simple definition.142 For instance, several sources have
suggested the possibility that young consumers could use loan
proceeds as income to obtain a credit card, although none of these
sources offer evidence of this phenomenon.143 In my survey, I
found that 27.27% (n=6) of students under twenty-one who were
applying by themselves listed loans as part of their income to
qualify for the credit card. If we also include students over
twenty-one, 30.56% (n=11) listed loan proceeds as part of their
income. While the number of students in this category is small,
this finding demonstrates that concerns about using one type of
debt to qualify for another type of debt are plausible.
Another problem I discovered through the surveys was the
extent to which students used money from their family as their
income or assets to qualify for a credit card. Of the students
under twenty-one who applied by themselves, 34.78% (n=8) listed
money from relatives as income. For those who hoped the CARD
Act would ensure young consumers could pay their debts on their
own, this number is troubling.
Finally, in general, students did not use earned wages as
income as often as proponents of the Act had hoped. Of the
students under twenty-one applying for a card on their own,
68.42% (n=13)144 reported having income below $10,000 a year,
and only 45.45% (n=10) listed income as the sole means for
obtaining a card. More surprising, only 52.27% (n=12) stated that
they used earned income at all to qualify for the card, with the
remainder relying on other sources.
142. See Joo et al., supra note 24, at 418 (“College students’ income is hard
to measure because the definition of income varies from student to student.”).
143. See Nelson, Schoolhouse to Poorhouse, supra note 9, at 28 (“Moreover, if
this incoming student takes out student loans to fund his or her educational
expenses, these loans can be treated as ‘income’ to independently qualify for a
card—a disconcerting practice that some student consumers have already begun
to implement.” (citation omitted)); Susan Tompor, Credit Card Offers Still
Contain Trouble Spots for Consumers, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 30, 2010, at
B4 (noting that “students [are] reporting a college loan as ‘income’ and some
card issuers [are] accepting that claim”).
144. Some respondents did not answer this question, which changes the
number and percentage ratios.
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Overall, these statistics paint a disturbing picture of the
effectiveness of the ability-to-pay provision. The lenient
requirements set up through Regulation Z have provided
numerous ways to qualify for credit outside of actually being able
to repay the debt.
2. Cosigning
Several news stories,145 academic articles,146 and a
participant at an FDIC advisory meeting147 have raised the
concern that the CARD Act would cause students to seek peer
cosigners, but no data exist to confirm or refute this
apprehension.148 Unlike fears about the inroads around the
income or asset requirement, this fear appears misplaced, at least
among the students I surveyed. Of the students under twenty-one
who applied for a new card within the few months before
completing the survey, 94.44% (n=17) used a parent as their
145. See David Migoya, College Students Duck New Credit-Card Law with
Friends, LOWELL SUN (MASS.), Sept. 8, 2010 (discussing college students’
cosigning for one another in order to get credit cards after the new law); see also
John C. Ninfo II, Commentary: An 18-Year-Old Needs a Credit Card?, DAILY
REC. (ROCHESTER, N.Y.), Jan. 26, 2010 (“Another concern is that parents, family
members or friends will not stop and think twice before co-signing for a credit
card for a young person who cannot meet the ‘independent means’ test . . . .”);
Tompor, supra note 143, at B4 (“[S]ome college students who are 18 or 19 are
asking friends twenty-one or older to co-sign their credit card applications.”).
146. See Nelson, Schoolhouse to Poorhouse, supra note 9, at 32 (“[O]lder
students, who may already have student loan and/or credit card debt, are
permitted to sign if they meet the issuers’ requirements. There have already
been reports of some college students paying older students and friends to serve
as cosigners.” (citations omitted)); Schwartz, supra note 9, at 427 (“Some
eighteen- to twenty-year-old students . . . simply ‘ask classmates or fraternity
brothers to co-sign’ their credit card application, ‘sometimes for a small
fee.’”(citations omitted)).
147. See Ted Beck, President & CEO, Nat’l Endowment for Fin. Educ.,
statement at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Meeting of the
Advisory Committee on Economic Inclusion to Discuss Children’s Savings and
Underserved Studies (Nov. 16, 2010) (“[W]e just did a survey, and 61 percent of
parents don’t want to co-sign their credit card. So what we’re finding—and I
don’t have a statistic for this—but young adults are going to their friends and
saying, ‘Would you co-sign for me?’ who are over 21.”).
148. See Migoya, supra note 145 (“There are few hard numbers on how the
trend is developing, but enough anecdotal evidence that it’s beginning to creep
upward.”).
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cosigner, while one student had a sibling cosign. No students
under the age of twenty-one reported having a friend or someone
other than a parent or sibling cosign for them.
One benefit of the CARD Act’s qualifications for young
consumers is that it may have helped formalize the surety
relationship that existed implicitly between many parents and
their children. Of the students under twenty-one that I surveyed,
31.33% (n=104) expected someone else, most likely their parents,
to pay their credit card debt. Prior to the CARD Act’s
requirements about young consumers having cosigners, parents
may have been informally drafted into the debtor-creditor
relationship. Indeed, several members of Congress expressed this
concern when debating the CARD Act’s young-consumer
provisions,149 and one academic has criticized the practice of
credit card companies “exploiting familial ties to reach into the
pockets of those with whom there is no formal contract.”150
Findings in a study conducted by the Education Resources
Institution and Institute for Higher Education Policy showed that
63% of students obtained their first card without a cosigner.151
That number is slightly higher than my study, in which 56.09% of
students applied on their own, perhaps suggesting that the
CARD Act is making cosigning more common. Although it is
impossible to draw out any causal inferences with my survey’s
data, the high number of parents listed as cosigners suggests that
more parents will be formal, not merely informal, guarantors of
student debt.

149. For instance, the CARD Act was originally introduced “to prevent credit
card issuers from taking unfair advantage of college students and their parents.”
155 Cong. Rec. S174 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 2009) (statement of Sen. Herb Kohl)
(emphasis added) (proposing to amend the TILA for the purpose of preventing
this exploitation).
150. Adam Benforado, Don’t Blame Us: How Our Attributional Proclivities
Influence the Relationship Between Americans, Business and Government, 5
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 509, 528 (2010).
151. See EDUC. RES. INST. & INST. HIGHER EDUC. POLICY, CREDIT RISK OR
CREDIT WORTHY? COLLEGE STUDENTS AND CREDIT CARDS 9 (1998) (“A majority of
students, 36%, received their credit cards by applying on their own.”).
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3. Access to Credit
One persistent criticism of the CARD Act’s restriction of
access to credit cards has been that it will prevent those under
twenty-one from getting credit cards,152 starting small
businesses,153 establishing a credit history,154 or having access to
an important source of credit.155 Also, some research suggests
that borrowers may turn to alternative financial service providers
if credit is unavailable.156
In my survey, I asked whether students thought they needed
a credit card to make purchases while they were in college.
Students were less likely than some academics to think they
needed credit cards. For students under twenty-one, only 38.85%
(n=155) answered that they thought they needed a credit card.
For students over twenty-one, the number jumped to 50.78%
(n=65), but the CARD Act’s ability-to-repay requirements do not
apply to that latter group.
I did not ask about whether students had turned to fringe
bankers for credit, but some evidence indicates that students are
turning to these lenders. In general, fringe lenders have gained
business because of the tightening of credit and stricter
regulations.157 More pointedly, one fringe lender has stated in a
152. See Brian Burnsed, New Rules Place Barriers Between Students, Credit
Card Issuers, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.usnews.com/education/
articles/2010/02/19/new-rules-place-barriers-between-students-credit-cardissuers (last visited Sept. 24, 2012) (“Peter Garuccio, a spokesman for the
American Bankers Association, a banking lobby group, says, ‘It’s pretty clear
that it will be tougher for people in this group to get credit cards. I think that
you’ll probably see a decline in the number of cards in this segment.’”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
153. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 432 (“By categorically withholding credit
cards from eighteen- to twenty-year-olds, section 301 seriously impedes their
ability to start up a business.”).
154. See Wood, supra note 9, at 175 (stating that young people must build
credit before they can buy cars or houses, and therefore, by preventing access to
credit cards, the Act “hampers the ability of . . . eighteen- to twenty-one-yearolds to become fully independent adult consumers”).
155. See Williams & Emley, supra note 9, at 1421–22 (noting that the rules
could prevent a spouse from opening a credit card because of a lack of personal
income or assets, even if the other spouse had substantial income and assets).
156. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 430–31 (listing possible alternatives to
credit cards but also pointing out some problems with them).
157. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Payday Lenders Go Hunting, WALL ST. J.,
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public securities filing that the CARD Act has increased demand
for its product:
In some cases we believe regulatory changes have resulted in a
constriction of the availability of unsecured credit for
consumers with poor or no credit history (for example, the
Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009,
which, among other things, disallowed the issuance of a credit
card to anyone under 21 without a co-signer or proof of ability
to repay and also curtailed the amount of fees that banks can
assess on cardholders). The Company believes that this
constriction in available sources of credit has resulted in, and
will continue to result in, an increased demand for our
services, which has produced a corresponding growth in our
fee and interest income, as well as an increase in our need for
employees and opportunities for opening new stores.158

Whether this is a harmful or salutatory development is, of course,
highly debatable, but it is worth noting that fringe credit
products are generally much less likely than credit cards to cause
borrowers to become over-indebted.159 Thus, if the Act is leading
students to alternative financial service providers, it may be
doing them a favor.
B. The Effects of Restrictions on Marketing to Young Consumers
As I mentioned in the introduction, legislators are proud of
the effects that they think the CARD Act’s provisions on
marketing are having. This subpart discusses data from my
surveys about offers students had recently received and credit
card marketing they had observed. I found that the number of
students receiving offers through the mail and being subjected to
Dec. 24, 2010 (“Payday lenders like Advance America are pushing hard to lure
away customers from traditional banks. The effort is getting a boost from the
industry’s loan crunch, especially for borrowers with blemished credit, and
toughened regulation of fees and interest rates charged by the nation’s 7,760
banks and savings institutions.”).
158. TMX Fin., LLC, Registration Statement under the Securities Act of
1933 (Amendment No. 2 to Form S-4), at 30 (Apr. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1511966/000119312511102503/ds4a.htm
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
159. See Hawkins, supra note 137, at 1399–1402 (arguing that the structure
of fringe credit transactions makes them difficult to link to financial distress).
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marketing remains high. The number appears, however, to have
decreased in the two years since the CARD Act was enacted.
To understand the effects of the CARD Act’s provision on
credit card marketing, I did not ask questions that tried to indict
companies for breaking the law. For some provisions of the Act,
this would be impossible because I could not measure how often,
for instance, credit reporting agencies were giving information
about young consumers to companies.160 More importantly, the
real purpose of the Act was to decrease harmful advertising and
student over-indebtedness, so the real measure of its
effectiveness requires a larger consideration of its effects than
mere compliance or noncompliance with the technical
requirements of the law.
1. Prescreened Mail Offers
Commentary on the CARD Act has praised it for “protect[ing]
students from insidious pre-screened offers with which they are
consistently bombarded.”161 The truth, however, is much more
nuanced. While it appears that the number of students reporting
credit card offers has dropped, it remains quite high.
I asked students whether they had “received any credit card
offers in the mail since the beginning of” either 2010 or 2011,
depending on the year I administered the survey. Overall, 68.92%
(n=275) of students under twenty-one reported receiving credit
card offers in the mail during the preceding year. Thus, a large
majority of students were still subjected to marketing through
mailed offers, despite the CARD Act going into effect in February
2010. The number of students reporting offers, however, did
decrease between 2010 and 2011. Of the students under twentyone, 76.13% (n=185) reported having received an offer in 2010,
but only 57.69% (n=90) indicated they had received an offer in
2011.
The fact that students are still receiving card offers does not
necessarily indicate that credit reporting agencies or credit card
companies are violating the CARD Act. Instead, credit card
160.
161.

For a description of this provision, see supra Part III.B.
Wood, supra note 9, at 170.
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companies are likely obtaining information for consumers who
are under twenty-one from sources other than credit reporting
agencies, such as “commercial mailing lists through memberships
to music or book clubs, magazine subscriptions, or by completing
sweepstakes entry cards.”162 As the study of agreements between
college-related entities and credit card issuers in this Article
found, 68.33% of such agreements require that the college-related
entity provide the issuer with student addresses.163 Issuers do not
rely exclusively on credit bureaus for student addresses, which
undermines the successfulness of the CARD Act’s attempt to cut
off offers. The CARD Act’s approach was purposefully indirect,
but its circularity appears to have undermined its effectiveness.
2. Marketing on and off Campus and Marketing Using Gifts
To measure the effectiveness of the CARD Act’s provision
forbidding issuers from offering tangible gifts to students, I asked
about whether students had seen any credit card marketing on
campus and off campus and not just about the specific marketing
prohibited by the Act of offering tangible gifts. I asked the
following questions:
During your time in college, have you seen any credit card
companies advertising ON or NEAR campus or at a student
event?
During your time in college, have you seen any advertising by
credit card companies OFF campus that appears to be directed
at college students?
During your time in college, have you seen any credit card
companies offering a gift (like a T-shirt or food) if you sign up
for a credit card?

I focused on marketing efforts in general because prior research
indicates credit cards draw in students for a variety of reasons. In
reporting on his extensive groundbreaking qualitative research,
Robert Manning describes the reasons his interviewees were
attracted to their credit cards. None of his interviewees report
that gifts were important to cards’ appeal. Often just the
162.
163.

Warwick & Mansfield, supra note 72, at 621.
See infra Part IV.C.
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advertisements were sufficient,164 and the motivation for some
students was credit issuers’ appeals to responsible uses of openended credit.165 Tangible gifts were “unnecessary.”166 Thus, I
wanted to measure the overall effect of the Act on marketing
activities, not a single subset of student marketing.
I asked about whether students had seen credit card
companies offering tangible gifts at all and not just offering
tangible gifts on campus because I wanted to capture what effect
the Act was having on tangible gifts whether on or off campus.
First, issuers could easily evade regulations without having any
meaningful effect on students’ experiences by offering gifts 1,001
feet from campus.167 Second, issuers can reach students on
campus with offers of tangible goods through electronic sources
like e-mail or social media. Companies cannot mail offers of
tangible goods,168 but because an e-mail address does not have a
physical location, credit card companies can send solicitations
offering tangible gifts to students sitting in their college dorm
rooms on their school “.edu” e-mail addresses.169
164. See MANNING, supra note 8, at 172 (“Jeff’s first credit card was an
impulsive response to a Citibank advertisement ‘that was hanging on the wall
in the dorm.’”); id. at 178 (“‘I saw advertisements in the [student] newspaper,
sign-up tables [in the student center], and applications [inserted] with my
textbooks [from the bookstore].’”); id. at 181 (“Citibank Visa advertisements
‘were plastered all over the university . . . .’”).
165. See id. at 175 (“He is most angered about how the credit card
companies’ marketing literature on campus praises the benefits of ‘responsible
use’ but neglects to inform impressionable and inexperienced students about the
downside, such as the impact of poor credit reports on future loans and even
potential employment.”).
In order to stretch her limited resources, Kristin decided to get her
own credit card, since she no longer had access to her parents’ plastic.
The slogan “It pays to Discover” was appealing because the “no
annual fee,” “build your own credit history,” and “cash back bonus”
features satisfied her need for financial control.
Id. at 188–89.
166. Id. at 190.
167. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.57(c)(3) (2012) (“A location that is within 1,000 feet
of the border of the campus of an institution of higher education, as defined by
the institution of higher education, is considered near the campus of an
institution of higher education.”).
168. See id. § 226.57(c)(4) (clarifying the prohibition on inducement by
stating that it includes mailing tangible goods to locations on or near campus).
169. See Truth in Lending, 75 Fed. Reg. 7658, 7758 (Feb. 22, 2010) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) (“An e-mail address does not physically exist
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To measure the effect of the Act, I compared the responses to
several questions about credit card marketing from students who
had only been in college during the time the CARD Act was in
effect with those who had been in college for at least some time
before the Act’s effective date.170 If the CARD Act was being
effective, I posited that students who had been in college only
during the time in which the Act was in effect should report
seeing credit card marketing at a substantially lower rate than
students who had been in college both during the time the Act
was in effect and the time it was not in effect.
Of students who had only been in college while the CARD Act
was in effect, 22.37% (n=68 of 304 students) reported seeing
credit card companies marketing on campus, while 49.10%
(n=109 of 222 students) of students who had been in school while
the Act was not in effect reported seeing on-campus marketing
efforts. This result is a statistically significant difference under
the chi-squared test.171 Similarly, 67.21% (n=205 of 305 students)
of students who had only been in college under the Act responded
that they had seen credit card marketing off campus directed at
students, while 81.07% (n=167 of 206) of those in school without
the Act had observed this type of marketing.172 Finally, 40.33%
(n=123 of 305 students) of students in school under the Act
reported seeing credit card companies giving gifts to students,
while 59.71% (n=123 of 206 students) in school without the Act
reported this conduct.173
These results are summarized in Figure 4:

anywhere, and therefore, cannot be considered an address on or near campus.”).
170. For the first year I conducted the survey, I compared freshmen versus
all other students, and for the second year, I compared freshmen and
sophomores versus all other students since the Act had been in effect for two
years.
171. χ2(1, N=524)=41.55, p < 0.001, Cramér’s V=0.28.
172. χ2(1, N=524)=11.97, p < 0.001, Cramér’s V=0.15.
173. χ2(1, N=524)=19.50, p < 0.001, Cramér’s V=0.19.
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Figure 4: Percentage of Students Reporting Credit Card
Marketing
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In each case, it appears that the number of students observing
marketing decreased by around 15–20% after the Act. This
difference, however, could be attributed to being in school for a
longer period of time and thus having more opportunities to see
marketing activity than the effectiveness of the CARD Act’s
provisions. In the first year I conducted the survey, 43.30% of
sophomores reported seeing credit card marketing on campus,
while 71.11% of seniors reported seeing credit card marketing on
campus. Each of those groups had been in school while the CARD
Act was not in effect, yet their answers differed by 30%. The chisquared test confirms that this difference between sophomores
and seniors is unlikely to be a result of chance.174 Thus, while the
numbers appear to suggest the Act is having an effect, I think
that effect is unlikely to be attributable to the Act.
The survey data do indicate, however, a decrease from 2010
and 2011 in the marketing reported by respondents. Of all the
freshmen surveyed in the first year I conducted the survey,
32.19% had seen credit card companies marketing on campus,
while only 12.20% of freshmen in the second year observed that
marketing. The difference between the first and second year is
174.

χ2(1, N=121)=5.84, p < 0.05, Cramér’s V=-0.22.
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not attributable to adding a second school to my survey pool
because the number of only University of Houston students
reporting marketing on campus dropped to 15.25% in the second
year of surveying. The number of freshmen reporting off-campus
marketing dropped from 73.29% in the first year to 62.60% in the
second year (or 64.41% if only University of Houston freshmen
are included). Finally, the number of freshmen reporting
companies handing out gifts decreased from 47.26% in the first
year to 32.52% in the second year (or 25.42% if only University of
Houston freshmen are included).
Together with the responses to the questions about mailed
offers, I summarize these results in Figure 5:
Figure 5: Percentage of Freshmen Reporting Credit Card
Marketing Over Two Years
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As depicted in Figure 5, it appears that for all categories, credit
card marketing directed at students is declining, and this decline
is statistically significant for all categories except mailed offers.175
Thus, while the level of students reporting credit card marketing
remains higher than proponents of the CARD Act may have
175. The chi-square test yielded the following results: for reports of mailed
offers (X2(1, N=266)=2.82, p < 0.1, Cramér’s V=0.10); for reports of gifts (X2(1,
N=266)=5.7, p < 0.05, Cramér’s V=0.15); for reports of on-campus marketing
(X2(1, N=266)=16.74, p < 0.001, Cramér’s V=0.25); for reports of off-campus
marketing (X2(1, N=266)=4.49, p < 0.05, Cramér’s V=0.13).
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predicted, the trend of fewer students reporting instances of
marketing suggests the Act may be effectively, although slowly,
curbing such marketing.
C. The Effects of the College–Issuer Marketing Agreements
Provisions
A variety of sources predicted before the Act passed that
forcing issuers to disclose their agreements with colleges would
affect the terms of those agreements.176 Others have since
claimed that, in response to the Act, issuers are amending their
agreements with organizations to remove marketing to
students.177 Based on my study of the agreements between
issuers and college-related entities, however, it appears that
these predictions are wrong.
The majority of agreements did not change at all between
2009 and 2010, despite the fact that the CARD Act was passed in
2009 and went into effect in February 2010. Of the 300
agreements I studied, 64.33% (n=193) remained exactly the same
in 2010 as they were in 2009, and for many agreements, the same
as they had been for years before that. Only 1% of the agreements
were first signed in 2009 or 2010.
It does appear that more agreements were terminated or
expired after the CARD Act went into effect, but it is impossible
to tell whether this change is merely correlative or if the CARD
176. See 155 Cong. Rec. S5493 (daily ed. May 14, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Dianne Feinstein) (arguing that transparency might “act as a deterrent to deals
with highly unfavorable terms to students”); see also Wood, supra note 9, at 171
(“Exposing the agreements will not only increase public awareness about these
practices but may also deter the more unconscionable aspects of these
agreements.” (citation omitted)).
177. See James Goodman, Credit Card Companies Adapt to College Rules,
ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT & CHRON., Nov. 1, 2010 (describing issuers’ new focus on
alumni rather than current students).
Given such restrictions, and with student loan debt at an all-time
high, credit card companies have shifted their focus to alumni. Betty
Riess, Bank of America spokeswoman, said in the past several years
the bank has been amending several agreements to eliminate
marketing to students. The bank has about 700 “collegiate affinity”
agreements, she said, and 98 percent of open accounts are “nonstudent.”
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Act caused companies or college-related entities to end the
agreements. For the agreements that were in effect at the start of
2009, the study revealed that 24 of 300 were terminated or
expired in that year, but in 2010, 63 were terminated or expired.
The mere fact that the number of terminations increased,
however, obviously does not mean the CARD Act caused the
change. It appears from the documents associated with the
agreements that all of the relationships ended in a normal course
of events, either because the agreement was set to expire (18
agreements) or the parties terminated the relationship pursuant
to the agreement (45 agreements). Often, the issuer initiated the
termination. Many of the termination letters followed this
passage, taken from a letter from FIA Card Services to an
organization, almost verbatim:
I am writing to inform you that following a comprehensive
review of the American Institute of Chemists, Inc. credit card
program, FIA Card Services, N.A. (f/k/a MBNA America Bank,
N.A.) (“FIA”) has decided to terminate our Amended and
Restated Affinity Agreement dated as of July 13, 1994, as the
same may have been amended ("Agreement”).178

Administrative reviews and decisions such as these seem to have
little to do with increased regulation. More than 70% of the
agreements that were terminated generated less than $5,000 in
2009 for the college-related entity, indicating a low activity level,
and thus low profitability for the issuer.
In only two cases in all of the 300 agreements that I reviewed
did I observe any mention of regulations influencing the decision
to end the arrangement. In one example from March 2009, before
the CARD Act was actually passed, an agent of the Tulane
University Alumni Association terminated its agreement with
Bank of America, explaining:
We have enjoyed our seven year affiliation with Bank of
America and we have been satisfied with our relationship with
the bank and especially with you as our account executive.
Our termination is rather a sign of the economic times, the

178. Letter from Alex J. McLaughlin, Vice President, FIA Card Servs., N.A.,
to Sharon Dobson, Exec. Dir., Am. Inst. of Chemists, Inc. (Apr. 15, 2010),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/CreditCardAgreementsContent/
CollegeAgreement_1174.pdf.
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increased projected scrutiny of university affinity programs
and the mission-relatedness of these affinity arrangements.179

Similarly, in November of 2008, just after the CARD Act was first
introduced, an alumni group associated with the University of
Houston indicated that regulatory pressure was influencing its
decision to end the agreement: “We believe this program is
counter to our mission to contact, engage, serve, empower and
acknowledge UHCL alumni. We also made this decision out of
appreciation for the pressures of credit and the frustration of
mailings.”180 The fact that only two agreements among 300
mention regulatory pressure suggests that based on outward
appearances, the CARD Act has had a negligible effect on the
number of agreement terminations.
Like the number of terminations, changes to the agreements
demonstrate little salutary effects from the CARD Act. Figure 6
summarizes the changes that occurred in the 83 agreements that
changed in 2010.

179. Letter from Charlotte B. Travieso, Dir., Office of Alumni Affairs,
Tulane Alumni Ass’n, to Nazanin Rad, Bank of Am. Bus. Dev. (Mar. 9, 2009),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/CreditCardAgreementsContent/
CollegeAgreement_25.pdf.
180. Letter from Charity Ellis, Dir. of Alumni & Cmty. Relations, Univ. of
Hous. Clear Lake, to Peggy Fullett, Vice President, Bank of Am. (Nov. 6, 2008),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/CreditCardAgreementsContent/
CollegeAgreement_784.pdf.
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Figure 6: Changes in College–Issuer Agreements After the CARD
Act Went into Effect
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CARD Act's
Intent
2%

Changed in
Ways that
Correspond
with the CARD
Act's Intent
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Twenty of the 300 agreements were amended in 2010. Of
those 20 amendments, 60.00% (n=12) were ministerial or added
provisions that likely have little effect on students’ experiences
with the agreements, such as establishing a web portal to access
accounts, extending the life of the agreement, or making small
changes to the royalties. For 25.00% of the amendments (n=5),
the changes were in line with the hopes of the CARD Act’s
sponsors. For instance, in several agreements, students were
omitted from the mailing lists that the college-related entity was
obligated to provide or the issuer stopped paying any royalties for
student accounts, taking away the incentive for the entity to
promote them. For the other 15.00% (n=3) of the amendments,
however, provisions were added that contradict the statute’s
intent. Several agreements, for example, added an obligation that
the college-related entity advertise for the issuer on its website,
and others added students to those persons covered by the
agreements. Thus, based on the continued stability of the number
of college–issuer agreements and the fact that very few
agreements changed to protect students from abuses, it appears
that the disclosure requirement has failed to meet its goals.
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V. Conclusion: Lessons from the CARD Act’s Young
Consumer Provisions
The survey of students and study of college–issuer
agreements in this Article have suggested that the CARD Act has
not quelled marketing to young consumers or ensured that young
consumers could repay their debts in the ways that proponents of
the Act had hoped. Survey data demonstrate that students are
using student loans to obviate the need to prove an ability to
repay credit card debt. Responses to the survey also reveal that a
high number of students are still receiving credit card offers in
the mail and are still observing credit card issuers on and off
campus targeting students with marketing, although the
numbers appear to be declining. Similarly, requiring the
disclosure of agreements between issuers and college-related
entities has had almost no effect on either the number of those
agreements or the terms of those agreements.
These results are significant if policymakers want more from
the CARD Act than a political victory. The empirical work in this
Article offers the first measurement of the Act’s actual effects,
and the reality is not as rosy of a picture as many of the
predictions about the Act had painted. More work needs to be
done to correct the inefficiencies in this market.
Future attempts to establish student credit card policies need
to adapt based on the lessons learned through the CARD Act.
Primarily, several provisions of the CARD Act failed because they
did not directly regulate the behavior that concerned
policymakers. For instance, the provision forbidding credit
bureaus from giving addresses for consumers under the age of
twenty-one did not have the desired effect of curtailing credit
card offers in the mail because it only addressed the problem
tangentially. Instead, if Congress really wants to prevent offers in
the mail, it could directly regulate the conduct, like it did to
prevent junk faxes.181 If young consumers were given a private

181. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (2011) (making it unlawful “for any person
within the United States, or any person outside the United States if the
recipient is within the United States—(C) to use any . . . device to send, to a
telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement” without meeting the
narrow exceptions in the statute).
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cause of action against issuers who violated this provision,182 the
number of students reporting instances of being mailed credit
card offers would likely drop significantly.183 In the same way, if
members of Congress want to alter the terms of agreements
between issuers and college-related organizations, they could do
so directly, instead of relying on disclosures to incentivize the
parties to change the agreements.184
A second way the CARD Act was misguided was its failure to
appreciate and respond to the business incentive of establishing
students as new credit card customers. Credit card companies
have an enormous stake in gaining college students as
customers.185 The strength of this incentive causes issuers to seek
creative ways for penetrating the student-card market despite
new regulations. As we have seen in a variety of markets,
creditors are nimble in avoiding unwanted regulation.186 Because
of this, a regulatory strategy that permits legitimate business
purposes while minimizing harms to consumers is preferable. In
the case of the CARD Act, the misuse of Sallie Mae’s figures on
student debt likely led Congress to regulate with a supposed—
and inaccurate—harm in mind instead of legitimate harms.187
Because the empirical work in this Article has removed this
barrier, legislators should reconsider amendments to cap total
balances on student cards. Such a regulation would allow issuers
to pursue student customers and make credit cards available to
students without the risk that students will be buried in debt.188
182. See, e.g., id. § 227(b)(3) (setting out a private cause of action for
violations of the junk fax statute).
183. Cf. MANN, supra note 8, at 154 (suggesting “a ban on marketing
directed at minors and college-age persons”).
184. See, e.g., Jill M. Norvilitis & Phillip Santa Maria, Credit Card Debt on
College Campuses: Causes, Consequences, and Solutions, 36 C. STUDENT J. 356,
361 (2002) (suggesting “changing how fees are paid to colleges or student
organizations” and providing the example that “if student groups received a flat
fee for sponsoring a table rather than an amount per completed application,
there might be less pressure on students to complete applications”).
185. See MANNING, supra note 8, at 167 (explaining the important role
students play in maintaining credit card companies’ market share).
186. See, e.g., Jim Hawkins, Credit on Wheels: The Law and Business of Auto
Title Lending, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 535 (2012) (describing how title lenders
have avoided usury rates to lend in many states).
187. See supra Part III.D.
188. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing Rep. Slaughter’s
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The harms that financial distress and misguidance cause to
young consumers are important and require a regulatory
response. In order to shape that response, however, we need to
evaluate the empirical claims behind policy prescriptions and
learn from the failures of the CARD Act. As policymakers take on
the student debt crisis, these lessons can help establish optimal
student credit policies.

proposed amendments to the CARD Act that would have limited student
balances).
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Appendix A: The CARD Act Student Survey189
Survey on the Effects of the CARD Act
Contact: Asst. Professor Jim Hawkins, 713-743-5018

Please circle your answer:
1. How many years have you been attending any college
full-time?
A. This semester is my first year
B. This is my second year
C. This is my third year
D. This is my fourth year
E. I have been attending college for more than four years
2. Are you under 21? A. Yes B. No
3. What is your gender? A. Male B. Female
4. What is your race?
A. Non-Hispanic White
B. Non-Hispanic Black/African American
C. Latino
D. Asian
E. Other
5. During your time in college, have you seen any credit
card companies advertising ON or NEAR campus or at a
student event?
A. Yes
B. No
6. During your time in college, have you seen any
advertising by credit card companies OFF campus that
appears to be directed at college students?
A. Yes
B. No

189. This survey is the version used in fall 2011 and spring 2012. The earlier
version of the survey is identical except that the dates are changed and some of
the language is aimed only at students at the University of Houston.
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7. During your time in college, have you seen any credit
card companies offering a gift (like a T-shirt or food) if
you sign up for a credit card?
A. Yes
B. No
8. Have you received any credit card offers in the mail
since the beginning of 2011?
A. Yes
B. No
9. How many credit cards do you currently have?
A. 0
B. 1
C. 2
D. 3
E. More than 3
10. Approximately how much do you currently owe on
your credit cards?
A. 0–$500
B. $500–$1,000
C. $1,000–$2,000
D. $2,000–$3,000
E. More than $3,000
11. Do you expect to pay off these balances yourself or do
you expect someone else will pay them off (like a parent)?
A. I expect to pay them off
B. I expect someone else will pay them off
12. Do you think you need a credit card to make purchases
during your time in college?
A. Yes
B. No
13. Since you started school this Fall, have you opened a
new credit card account?
A. Yes
B. No
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ONLY ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IF YOU HAVE OPENED A
NEW CREDIT CARD ACCOUNT SINCE STARTING SCHOOL THIS FALL
(I.E., YOU ANSWERED YES TO QUESTION 13).
14. Did you apply for the new credit card by yourself or
with a cosigner?
A. By myself
B. With a co-signer
C. Not applicable
15. If you had a cosigner, who was your cosigner?
A. Parent
B. Spouse
C. Friend
D. Sibling
E. Other
F. Not applicable
16. If you applied by yourself, what is your approximate
annual income?
A. Less than $10,000 a year
B. $10,000 - $20,000 a year
C. $20,000 - $30,000 a year
D. $30,000 - $40,000 a year
E. More than $40,000 a year
F. Not applicable
17. If you applied by yourself, circle all the answers that
you used as part of your “income” when applying for the
credit card:
A. Income from a job
B. Student loan proceeds
C. Money from parents/family
D. Other: _______________________________
E. Not applicable

